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PARTIES TO PROCEEDING 
A. Plaintiff: 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability company 
B. Defendants: 
Edward A. Reott, an individual ("Ed Reott") 
Key Energy Services, Inc. ("Key") 
J-West Oilfield Services, Inc., a Utah corporation ("J-West") 
Mission Energy, L.L.C, a Colorado limited liability company ("Mission") 
C. Counterclaim, Third Party and Cross-Claim Plaintiffs: 
Edward A. Reott ("Ed Reott") 
Goal, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability company ("Goal") 
Regoal, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation ("Regoal") 
D. Third Party, Counterclaim and Cross-Claim Defendants: 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C ("Wasatch") 
Mission Energy, L.L.C, a Colorado limited liability company ("Mission") 
Wasatch Oil & Gas Production Corporation, a Utah corporation ("WOGC") 
Wasatch Gas Gathering, L.L.C, a Utah limited liability company 
Bill Barrett Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("BBC") 
E. Defined Terms: As used herein, "Reott" collectively refers to Ed Reott and the 
companies he owns, Goal and Regoal. "Wasatch" refers collectively to Wasatch Oil & 
Gas, L.L.C, Wasatch Oil & Gas Production Company and Wasatch Gas Gathering, 
L.L.C, as they all are commonly controlled. For simplicity of reference to legal 
positions and in non-factual contexts, "Wasatch" may also refer to both BBC and all 
three Wasatch entities. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Reott accept Wasatch and BBC's Statement of Jurisdiction. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 7(c)(3)(A), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party 
contends no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately 
stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. Each fact set 
forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by- the 
responding party. 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts 
that is controverted, and may contain a separate statement of 
additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that 
is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation of 
the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For any 
additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact 
shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation 
to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
Rule 69(j)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure1: 
Real property sold subject to redemption, or any part sold 
separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their 
successors in interest: (A) the judgment debtor; (B) a creditor 
having a lien by judgment, mortgage, or other lien on the property 
sold, or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to that on which 
the property was sold. 
1
 Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. P., was repealed effective November 1, 2004 and replaced with 
Rules 69A, B and C. All references herein are to Rule 69 in existence in 2001 and 2002 
when Wasatch attempted to redeem. (A copy of former Rule 69 is provided in 
Appellees' Addendum, Tab C.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Reott offers 
the following Statement of Issues in lieu of those offered by Appellants', as it more 
accurately identifies the issues before the Court: 
I. Did The District Court Correctly Determine That There Are No Genuine 
Issues Of Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment In Favor Of Reott? 
II. Did The District Court Correctly Conclude That Reott, As The Purchaser At 
The Sheriffs Sale And The Party Affected By Redemption, Had Standing To 
Challenge Whether Wasatch Is A Successor-in-interest To Mission? 
IIL Did The District Court Correctly Conclude That Wasatch Did Not Obtain 
Legal Title To Section 32 And Therefore Is Not A Successor-in-interest To 
Mission When Mission Is Not Identified As Grantor On The Conveyance 
Documents? 
IV. Did The District Court Correctly Conclude That Wasatch Has No Equitable 
Title To Section 32 And Therefore Is Not A Successor-in-interest To Mission 
Where Wasatch Obtained Its Interest By Fraudulent Transfer And Where 
Wasatch Has Not Proven Mission's Intent To Transfer Section 32? 
V, Did The District Court Correctly Conclude That Wasatch's Interest in The 
Section 32 Leases (And Other Interests) Were Obtained By Fraudulent 
Transfer? 
Each of these issues were presented to the District Court in the parties' summary 
judgment briefs. (R. 2622-2644, 2645-2728, 4073-4107,4349-4416.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court determines 
whether the District Court correctly determined that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and that judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Ryan v. Dan's Food 
Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 400 (Utah 1998). When the material facts are not disputed, 
this Court reviews de novo the legal basis for the District Court's ruling, for correctness. 
1 
University of Utah v. Shurtleff 2006 UT 51, \ 15, 144 P.3d 1109, 1114; Hansen v. Eyre, 
2005 UT 29, If 8, 116 P.3d 290, 292. The "[fjacts are viewed in a light most favorable to 
the losing party below." Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After Reott purchased Mission's interest in Section 32 at Sheriffs Sale, Wasatch 
filed a Notice of Redemption, and, that same day, sued Reott to quiet title. Reott objected 
to Wasatch's redemption and counterclaimed, asserting that Wasatch has no legal title, 
due to the defects in the conveyance, and no equitable title because it had obtained its 
interest in Section 32 by fraudulent transfer. The District Court granted Reott's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment concluding that Wasatch is not entitled to redeem. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Reott accepts Wasatch and BBC's statement of the course of proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 16, 2005, the District Court entered its Ruling, granting partial 
summary judgment to Wasatch and Reott on issues of redemption, fraudulent 
conveyance, quiet title, trespass, trespass to chattels and conversion ("Ruling"). (R. 
4810-4818; a copy is provided in Appellees' Addendum, Tab A.) On May 24, 2006, the 
District Court entered the Statement of Material Undisputed Facts, which lists 128 
undisputed facts. (R. 5395-5424; a copy is provided in Appellees' Addendum, Tab B, 
and all citations herein to "Fact Y refer to that Statement of Undisputed Facts.) In that 
Statement and following each fact is a citation to the parties' summary judgment 
2 
pleadings. The citation identifies the party who proposed the fact and confirms that the 
fact was not disputed below. These are the operative facts for consideration on appeal. 
Reott rejects Wasatch's Statement of Facts because they virtually ignore the 
Statement of Undisputed Facts and present their own version of the facts, including 
disputed and new facts. In addition, Wasatch includes legal argument regarding whether 
the facts support each of the eleven badges of fraud. These should not be considered as a 
basis to undermine facts that Wasatch elected, for strategic or other reasons, not to 
dispute or failed to include below. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 
1996) (declining to consider issues raised for first time on appeal). As such, for purposes 
of reviewing the Quiet Title Ruling, only the material undisputed facts, as determined by 
the District Court, are relevant. They are summarized as follows: 
Mission is a Colorado limited liability company. (Fact f 109.) Mission's 
Operating Agreement identifies four initial managers: Fred J. Jager, ("Jager") Justin C. 
Sutton ("Sutton"), William F. Muller, and Charles B. Willard. (Fact 1fH0.) The 
Operating Agreement requires four managers at all times and requires a majority (i.e., 
three) of these managers to agree and approve all major company decisions. Signatures 
of two managers are required to convey corporate assets. (Fact fflf 111,112.) 
In 1997, Mission was the record title owner of two mineral leasehold interests in 
Carbon County, Utah—ML 43541 (560 acres) and ML 43798 (80 acres)—issued by the 
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") and located in 
Section 32 of Township 12 South, Range 16 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("Section 
3 
32 Leases"). (Fact ffif 12, 13.) The Section 32 Leases cover the entire 640 acres of 
Section 32, with mineral rights from the surface to the center of the earth. (Fact f 16.) 
On February 24, 1997, the Estate of Lavinia Reott, Ed Reott's mother, made a 
bridge loan of $160,000 to Mission. (Fact U 17.) In 1997, Mission began drilling 
operations for a well on Section 32, which bears Lavinia's name ("Lavinia Well"). 
Mission promised, but did not, repay the bridge loan in three months. (Fact fflj 17,18.) 
After trial in the Colorado Federal District Court, and on December 20, 1999, Reott 
obtained a judgment against Mission in the amount of $204,000, plus costs and post-
judgment interest at 5.67% ("Reott Judgment"). (Fact ^  19.) 
At the time Reott made the bridge loan to Mission in February 1997, Mission had 
no ability to repay the loan within the time promised. (Fact ^ 95.) Mission's accountant, 
Bruce Hill, testified that Mission was undercapitalized, that its financial condition was 
marginal in 1998, and that it did not have the money to pay the 1999 Reott Judgment. 
(Fact |^ 94.) Mission's June 1999 and December 1999 accounts payable ledgers reflect 
that Mission was not paying its debts as they came due. (Fact ^ 97.) Mission's balance 
sheet showed that its liabilities exceeded its assets. (Fact ^ 98.) Mr. Hill stated that by 
December 1999, he would have advised Mission's creditors not to bother attempting to 
collect debts from Mission. (Fact ^ 94.) 
Mission did not pay the February 1997 Reott bridge loan. (Fact ffl 17, 18.) 
Between February 1998 and May 2000, eleven mechanic's liens were recorded against 
Mission's interest in the Section 32 Leases. (Fact ffi| 20, 96.) Key Energy recorded its 
mechanic's lien against Mission's interest in Section 32 in February 1999. (Fact ^ 21.) 
4 
J-West filed its mechanic's lien against Mission's interest in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 in 
August 1999. (Fact 122.) 
Notwithstanding the liens, lawsuits and judgments, Mission, only through the 
action of Sutton, conveyed, in three separate transactions, essentially all of its assets to 
Wasatch, pursuant to three separate agreements which occurred in June 1999, May 2000 
and June 2000 (Fact ^ 99, 100, 101). The last transfer occurred on or about June 21, 
2000, is reflected in a letter, and contemplates Mission's transfer of interest in ten leases, 
including the Section 32 Leases, existing APDs (drilling permits), and the Jack Canyon 
Unit operations, ("June 2000 Letter"). (Fact 1f 101.) 
The June 2000 Letter was never recorded. (Fact f^ 102.) It is signed only by 
Sutton, and not two managers as required by the Operating Agreement. (Appellants' Br., 
Tab E.) There is no evidence that the letter was approved by three managers. 
After the second, but before the last transfer in June 2000, J-West obtained a 
default judgment against Mission on May 22, 2000. (Fact ^ 27). On October 27, 2000, 
Reott domesticated his judgment against Mission in Carbon County. (Fact f 57.) On 
December 13, 2000, Key Energy obtained its judgment against Mission. (Fact f 61.) 
The Section 32 Leases at issue here are part of the Jack Canyon Unit ("JCU") and 
were part of the June 2000 Letter. The terms of that letter provide that Mission "will" 
assign to Wasatch Mission's interest in ten leases, including the Section 32 Leases, in 
exchange for "a right to participate in a 'trade' relating to a drilling deal that Wasatch 
may be successful in putting together on the leases." (Fact <[fl[ 28-32; Appellant's Br., 
Tab E.). Wasatch was not required to put together a drilling deal. (Fact ^ 52.). And, 
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Wasatch never did. (Id..) Wasatch agreed to assume the obligation to maintain the leases 
and agreed to "reimburse" Mission for $3,629.40 in rental payments that Mission had 
made on the leases. (Fact ^ 31.) 
On June 23, 2000, Sutton executed three Mineral Lease Assignment Forms for the 
Section 32 Leases. (Fact J^ 33.) The forms do not reflect that they were signed by 
Mission Energy, LLC, nor do they reflect Mr. Sutton's representative capacity. (Fact 
135.) See Appellants' Br., Tab F. The notary does not indicate that Mission signed the 
Assignments. (Fact ^ 38.) Sutton was not the record title leasehold owner of the Section 
32 Leases and never held any interest in them. (Fact f 36.) Mission held record title. 
Wasatch decided, on its own, that the Key Energy mechanic's lien, the J-West 
mechanic's lien and the J-West judgment only attached to forty-acre spacing for the 
Lavinia Well (Fact K 46), and not to the 640-acre spacing previously established by the 
then operative spacing order.2 (Fact ^ 44.) Wasatch and Mission decided to horizontally 
and vertically "carve or fillet out that well and the forty acres that goes with it and move 
it aside." (Fact ^ 47.) Horizontally, Mission and Wasatch agreed that from ML43541, 
-originally a 560 acre lease (with rights from surface to earth's center), Mission would 
retain only those leasehold rights limited to the forty-acre parcel upon which they 
2
 Prior to the Sheriffs Sale, the Spacing Order attributable to Section 32 provided that 
one well could be drilled on every 640 acres. Under Utah Code Ann. §38-10-102 
(2005), liens on mineral rights attach to the "production unit," among other interests. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-10-101 (2005) defines "production unit" as "the drilling unit for a 
well established by lawful order or rule of the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining in which the 
well is located; or if not applicable, 40 acres comprising the quarter-quarter section . . . in 
which the well is located." In this case, all liens and judgments would attach to the entire 
640 acre section of Section 32. 
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determined Lavinia 1-32 well is located. (Fact 1f 41.) Vertically, Mission would retain 
only those leasehold rights in ML43541 from the surface to a production depth of only 
3,398 feet. (Fact f 41.) Wasatch would obtain the remaining 520 acres, with rights from 
surface to earths center, and the deep production rights below the Lavinia Well, 
beginning at 3,398 ft to earth's center. Mission and Wasatch requested that SITLA 
partition and re-designate the remaining 520 acres as lease ML43541-A. (Fact f 54.) 
Wasatch was not interested in the Lavinia Well, and it believed that it was "more 
of a liability than it was of any value." (Fact f 48.) WOGC knew that after the June 
2000 transaction, Mission would be without any assets with the exception of the Lavinia 
Well, which WOGC believed to be more of a liability than of any value. (Fact ffl[ 48, 50.) 
The Mineral Lease Assignment Forms for the Section 32 Leases were not recorded 
at the time of the transaction, were not recorded at the time of the subsequent Sheriffs 
Sale, and were not recorded at the time Wasatch filed its Redemption Notice. (Fact 
1f 103.) 
After transferring the last of Mission's assets, Sutton, on August 22, 2000, sent a 
letter to Todd Cusick of Wasatch, directing*him keep the transfers confidential: 
There are several creditors with outstanding issues . . . specifically 
Ed Reott. . . . I must advise your offices to refer any similar 
creditor, or legal calls directly to my attention. Further given the 
confidentiality of the agreements entered into between our 
companies, I would request that no verbal, or written information 
be sent to anyone without prior written permission from Mission 
Energy. 
(Fact H 104.) 
7 
That same day, August 22, 2000, Sutton wrote to Ed Reott, representing, among 
other things that Mission was "protecting" the company's business: 
. . . the managers of Mission Energy are doing everything possible 
to protect the assets of the company. We are working with several 
companies to develop a drilling program in hopes of receiving 
revenues to pay off creditors of the company. In that regard, many 
of those creditors who are owed monies for operations and 
permitting that have not been paid are working with Mission to try 
and make the company successful. 
The letter did not disclose to Reott that nearly all assets had been transferred to Wasatch. 
(Fact 1f 105.) By letters dated October 23, 2000, Sutton wrote to Reott's attorney, federal 
judges, magistrates and court clerks, that effective October 1, 2000, Sutton resigned as 
manager. (Fact f 107.) The forwarding address he provided was not to "legal counsel," 
as he represented. (Fact ^J108.) Thereafter, Mission conducted no further business. 
On October 27, 2000, Reott domesticated his Colorado Federal Court judgment 
against Mission by filing it with the Carbon County Recorder. (Fact ffi[ 57-58.) The Key 
Energy, J-West and Reott Judgment all predate the recording of the Mission-Wasatch 
Assignment. (Fact ffif 103, 27, 61, 19.) Reott purchased the Key Energy and J-West 
judgments. (Fact ffif 62, 64.) On May 16, 2001, Reott executed against Mission's interest 
in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. (Fact 1J 66.) The Sheriffs Sale was held on August 9, 
2001. (Fact % 67.) No bidders appeared at the sale so Reott credit bid $1.00 and received 
a Certificate of Sale from the Sheriff for all of Mission's interests in Sections 27, 32, 33 
and 34. (Fact % 18.) Wasatch attempted to redeem and tendered $1.06 to the Sheriff. 
(Fact ffi[ 71, 79.) On the same day, Wasatch filed a complaint to quiet title ("Quiet Title 
Action"). (Fact ^ 71.) In response to the Notices of Redemption, Reott filed a "Notice 
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that Wasatch is not a Proper Party to Redeem or the Amount of Redemption is 
Insufficient." (Fact f 87.) Reott did not accept the redemption money. (Fact f 86.) On 
February 9, 2002, the Sheriff issued the Sheriffs Deed to Reott (Fact f 82), and on 
March 11, 2002, Reott recorded it. (Fact ^  84.) 
In this action, Reott counterclaimed, and on April 14 and 18, 2002, Reott filed Lis 
Pendens against the disputed property. (Fact f 89.) On April 30, 2002, Wasatch sold 
numerous leases, including its purported interest in Section 32, to BBC. (Fact f 92.) 
BBC did not require Wasatch to pay the judgment liens. On October 7, 2002, Reott filed 
a motion to add BBC as a defendant, which was later granted. (R. 220, 1096). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
In its Statement of Undisputed Facts, the District Court numerically identified 128 
undisputed facts. The reality is that Wasatch did not dispute these 128 facts. These facts 
were entered by the District Court after reviewing Wasatch and BBC's pleadings. In 
their Summary Judgment Memorandum, Wasatch and BBC objected to nineteen of 
Reott's ninety-nine facts and stated that sixty-four specific facts were not disputed and 
offered undisputed facts of their own. In objecting, neither Wasatch nor BBC followed 
Rule 7(c), Utah R. Civ. P. After failing to dispute sufficient material facts to preclude a 
summary judgment, Wasatch and BBC now belatedly assert that there are material facts 
in dispute preventing summary judgment. The District Court was careful to specifically 
reference each fact to the record and to demonstrate that neither Wasatch nor BBC 
disputed the fact or that the dispute was not material. (See Appellees' Addendum, Tab 
B.) The District Court was correct in entering the Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
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Neither Wasatch nor BBC provided legal argument in the District Court that the 
undisputed facts do not apply to the statutory factors that define intent for a fraudulent 
transfer. Wasatch did not dispute that the undisputed facts supported nine badges of 
fraud (factors) under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 (1998 & Supp. 2006). The District Court 
was correct in reviewing the undisputed facts and applying them to the factors for actual 
intent for a fraudulent transfer and concluding a fraudulent transfer occurred. 
In apparent recognition of their inability to defend against the merits of the District 
Court's ruling, Wasatch and BBC assert that Reott lacks standing to assert his defense of 
their claims. Specifically, Wasatch now asserts that (i) Reott has no standing because he 
suffered no injury; and (ii) under this Court's holding in Brockbank, Reott, as a 
foreclosing creditor, cannot rely on a fraud theme to defeat redemption. Neither Wasatch 
nor BBC argued below that Reott has no standing because he suffered no injury. 
Wasatch and BBC have misapplied Brockbank because it deals with execution against the 
personal right of redemption, something Reott did not do. As the purchaser at the 
Sheriffs Sale and recipient of the Sheriffs Deed, Reott has an inherent right to protect 
his interests against a party with no legal right to redeem. 
Wasatch claims in its Introduction "[t]he trial court correctly held that, absent a 
sufficient defense, the lease assignment forms in tandem with the Letter Agreement gave 
Wasatch an equitable interest in Section 32 interests sufficient to support a right of 
redemption." (Appellant's Br. 21.) This is a false statement. The District Court did not 
so rule. (See Ruling at 7, Tab B.) The District Court ruled Wasatch does not have legal 
or equitable title. Id. 
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Wasatch states that the undisputed evidence establishes Mission's intent to transfer 
to Wasatch an interest in Section 32. (Appellants' Br. 30-31.) Wasatch's statement is not 
cited to the record and is false. First, Mission did not sign the Section 32 Assignments so 
Wasatch does not have legal title. Second, Wasatch has no ability to prove Mission's 
intent because: (i) it has no testimony from Mission; (ii) it cannot introduce parol 
evidence to indicate Mission's intent to construe a conveyance executed solely by Sutton; 
and (iii) Mission's Operating Agreement requires three managers to approve and two 
managers to sign a conveyance, which did not occur. Mission's intent to transfer the 
Section 32 Leases was not and cannot be proven. Further, a fraudulent transfer occurred. 
Therefore, since Wasatch has not shown legal or equitable title, it is not a successor-in-
interest and cannot redeem. 
SITLA does not have authority to make final judicial decisions on legal title to 
property. That is reserved for the courts. While SITLA does approve lease assignments, 
its approval governs only the relationship between SITLA and its "apparent" lessees, 
SITLA's approval does not determine the legal contest between Reott, as the purchaser of 
the lease rights at the Sheriffs Sale, and Wasatch who, without legal title, claims to be 
the legal lessee. 
The District Court determined a fraudulent transfer occurred in the attempt to 
transfer the property from Mission to WOGC. In its ruling it did not do a detailed 
discussion. It did not need to do so. Wasatch and BBC contested few of the facts 
surrounding the attempt to transfer property from Mission to WOGC. Such a transfer 
would keep the property away from Mission's creditors, such as Reott. In the District 
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Court, Reott specifically provided facts to support and legal argument showing eleven 
badges of fraud to support his claim of fraudulent transfer from Mission to WOGC. 
Wasatch and BBC only argued against two of the eleven badges of fraud supporting a 
fraudulent transfer. They failed to contest facts and Reott's legal arguments that the 
undisputed facts supporting nine uncontested badges of fraud constitute a fraudulent 
transfer. One badge of fraud is sufficient to find fraudulent transfer. The District Court 
was correct in ruling a fraudulent transfer from Mission to WOGC occurred, and 
Quieting Title in Reott. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE 
WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT 
PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF REOTT. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is not precluded 
simply when some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely 
controverted. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1978). When a 
moving party "challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to 
present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, f^ 35, 54 P.3d 1054, 1064. The 
nonmoving party must present "evidence that could be interpreted to satisfy the elements 
of the claim." Id. at 1064. This evidence must be "more than just conclusory assertions 
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that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Id. at 1063. Further, 
genuine issues of material fact must be established, as required by Rules 7 and 56, Utah 
R. Civ. P. 
A. Wasatch and BBC Did Not Dispute the Material Facts, 
The District Court entered its Statement of Undisputed Facts, identifying 128 
specific facts that were not disputed.3 (R. 5395-5427.) While Wasatch and BBC make 
myriad arguments contending that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Reott's 
fraudulent transfer claim, they do not challenge the specific facts contained in the 
Statement of Undisputed Facts. They do not identify that any one of the 128 facts is in 
dispute. The reason that Wasatch does not challenge the Statement of Undisputed Facts 
on appeal is simple—Wasatch and BBC did not dispute them below.4 {See Wasatch's 
Opposition and Reply, R. 4076-4085; BBC's Opposition, R. 3665-3668.) The Statement 
of Undisputed Facts stand unchallenged on this appeal, and this Court should affirm the 
District Court's determination that the material facts are not in dispute. 
3
 Those facts were taken, for the most part, verbatim from the parties' Statement of 
Undisputed Facts as proposed in the summary judgment briefs. In support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Reott identified ninety-nine facts as undisputed. Wasatch listed 
by number ten facts it identified as disputed: 1, 30, 30B, 30C, 44, 55, 56, 72, 73 and 82. 
(R. 4080-84.) As to the remaining facts, Wasatch stated there was "not a material 
dispute." (R. 4080-85.) BBC joined in that statement. (BBC Opposition at 5, R. 3665.) 
In addition, BBC identified nine facts that it disputed: 49, 83, 84, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96 and 
97. (R. 3665-68.) Only one (number 49) relates to the issues on this appeal. As to facts 
they attempted to dispute, they did not meet their burden, as the nonmoving party under 
Rules 7 and 56, Utah R. Civ. P., to repeat verbatim the fact in dispute, explain the 
dispute, and provide evidence to prove that a genuine issue of material fact existed. 
4
 The Statement of Undisputed Facts is comprised of the undisputed facts from Wasatch, 
BBC and Reott's briefs. 
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On appeal, and in Wasatch's Statement of Facts, Wasatch states that "besides the 
badges of fraud," it disputed "many other facts alleged by Reott and adopted by the trial 
court." Wasatch improperly provides a record cite to R. 4851-4914, 4924-59. This 
record cite is to Wasatch's post-judgment Objections to Reott's proposed Statement of 
Undisputed Facts requested by the District Court. Challenging Reott's proposed facts for 
the first time after the District Court's ruling does not show that Wasatch and BBC met 
their burden to establish a genuine issue of material fact before the Court ruled. 
B
- The District Court Did Not "Find" Any Fact And Did Not Make Any 
Impermissible "Findings" Regarding The Nine Badges Of Fraud Or 
The "Materiality" Of Any Specific Fact. 
Although the material facts were not disputed below, Wasatch and BBC attempt to 
create a "genuine issue of material fact" on appeal. Wasatch and BBC make several new 
arguments asserting that the District Court made impermissible findings of fact, including 
"finding" the nine badges of fraud, inferring fraudulent intent, and finding that certain 
facts were material to the fraudulent transfer claim. (Appellants' Br. 14.) Each of these 
arguments fail for three reasons. 
First, these arguments are raised for the first time on appeal and were not 
presented, in any manner, for consideration to the District Court. {See generally 
Wasatch's Opposition and Reply, R. 4073; BBC Opposition, R. 3661.) As this Court has 
repeatedly confirmed, it does not address arguments for the first time on appeal. Walter 
v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, Tf 33, 67 P.3d 1042, 1049. Wasatch has not established 
there is any reason for this Court to raise issues that could have been raised below. 
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Coleman ex rel Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d 1122, 1123. As such, this 
Court should not consider them. 
Second, the District Court did not make "findings." A determination that 
undisputed facts may or may not satisfy a statutory or common law "badge of fraud" is 
nothing more than the application of fact to law for the purpose of determining a 
fraudulent transfer. It is not an impermissible "finding of fact," and Wasatch and BBC 
cite no authority in support of this new argument. 
The Fraudulent Transfer Act ("Act")5 provides that a transfer is fraudulent if it is 
made with the "actual intent to defraud, hinder or delay" a creditor. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 25-6-5 (1998 & Supp. 2006). Because "actual intent" is difficult to prove absent an 
outright admission, the Act provides that "actual intent" can be proven through "badges 
of fraud," which are comprised of "facts that that throw suspicion on a transaction." 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation 
omitted). The Act provides a non-exclusive list of factors historically considered in 
common law as "badges of fraud," including whether: 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the 
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit . . . ; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all of the debtor's assets; 
5
 Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides alternative bases to prove that a 
transfer was fraudulent. A transfer is fraudulent under § 25-6-6 of the Act if it is made 
for less than reasonably equivalent value while the debtor is insolvent. See id., § 25-6-6 
(1998). A transfer also is fraudulent under § 25-6-5 of the Act if it is made with the 
"actual intent to defraud, hinder or delay." Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 (1998). Reott 
argued both below. In this case, the undisputed facts support both. 
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(f) the debtor absconded . . . ; 
(h) the value of the consideration received . . . 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after 
the transfer was made . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2) (1998). Other badges of fraud include failure to record the 
conveyance, secrecy or haste in the transfer, and conveyance not made in the ordinary 
course of business. See United States v. Christensen, 751 F. Supp. 1532, 1536 (D. Utah 
1990), appeal dismissed, 961 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Dahnken, Inc. of Salt 
Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
Determining whether undisputed facts support one or more badges of fraud is 
nothing more than applying the undisputed facts to the elements of a claim. In 
concluding that the undisputed facts establish the elements of a fraudulent transfer, a 
court is not "finding" actual intent or "drawing inferences of fraud." Rather, the Act 
provides that if certain codified and common law factors are established, "actual intent" 
may be proven and the statutory elements of fraudulent transfer are established. 
Third, the District Court did not enter "findings" regarding the materiality of any 
fact. In fact, the "materiality" of any specific fact and its application to fraudulent 
transfer was not at issue below, because Wasatch and BBC did not properly make it one. 
In his summary judgment brief, Reott identified the undisputed facts, discussed Utah's 
fraudulent transfer law, and analyzed how the facts established eleven badges of fraud. 
Wasatch and BBC did not oppose the fraudulent transfer claim and did not challenge 
Reott's analysis of the badges of fraud. Wasatch and BBC did not argue that any specific 
fact was or was not material to the existence of any specific badge of fraud or to the 
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fraudulent transfer claim. (R. 3665-68, 4076-85.) As such, this Court should decline to 
consider for the first time on appeal Wasatch and BBC's arguments that certain facts are 
not material to establishing a badge of fraud or to proving Reott's fraudulent transfer 
claim. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at 1022.6 
POINT IL THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN RULING 
THAT REOTT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE WASATCH'S 
CLAIM TO BE MISSION'S SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST, UNDER 
RULE 69 UTAH R CIV, P., AND ENTITLED TO REDEEM THE 
SECTION 32 LEASES. 
Wasatch asks this Court to rule that, even if Wasatch obtained the Section 32 
Leases by fraudulent transfer, its right to redeem is absolute. As such, Wasatch's focus 
has been on challenging Reott's ability to dispute Wasatch's redemption. However, all of 
Wasatch's arguments fail. 
A. Reott Has A Personal Stake Sufficient For Standing. 
Wasatch and BBC argued below that Reott lacked "standing" to challenge 
Wasatch's redemption based on Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App. 251, 32 P.3d 
990, and based on the argument that he is no longer a "judgment creditor." (R. 2636-40.) 
On appeal, Wasatch and BBC now assert that Reott lacks standing "because he suffered 
no injury by reason of Wasatch's redemption of the Section 32 Lease interests." 
6
 Wasatch cites Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 470 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1970) for 
the proposition that the "materiality" of a fact is a finding of fact, requiring a trial. 
Burnham does not apply. In Burnham, the court was faced with the specific issue of 
"whether or not a misstatement in an [insurance] application is material to the risk." The 
court essentially stated that the importance of the false information provided or the true 
information withheld, was a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 263. Burnham is not a 
fraudulent transfer case, has nothing to do with the materiality of any fact to a badge of 
fraud, and has nothing to do with applying facts to law. Burnham is inapplicable. 
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(Appellants' Br. 24.) This Court need not consider this new argument on appeal. State v. 
Nelson, 725 P.3d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986). 
Nevertheless, this argument is without merit. Reott agrees that to have standing, 
he must have "some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the 
outcome of the dispute." Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 
UT 58, \ 17, 82 P.3d 1125, 1131. Reott has a personal stake in the outcome of this 
dispute. As a Sheriffs Sale purchaser, he has a property interest in Section 32, and will 
suffer a "distinct and palpable injury" if title is quieted in Wasatch, a party not entitled to 
redeem. 
B. The District Court Correctly Determined That Reott As The 
Purchaser At The Sheriffs Sale, Has Standing To Challenge Wasatch's 
Right To Redeem. 
Wasatch argues that Reott relinquished his judgment creditor status by bidding at 
the Sheriffs Sale and therefore does not have standing to challenge Wasatch's attempt to 
redeem. (Appellants' Br. 25.) It is well-settled that, as the Sheriffs Sale purchaser with 
a Sheriffs Deed, Reott has an inherent right to protect his interests in the property 
acquired and to challenge the validity of Wasatch's attempt to redeem. Phyfe v. Riley, 15 
Wend. 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) ("A purchaser is not bound to accept the amount of his 
bid from a person who has no right to redeem, and may insist that the deed be executed to 
him in pursuance of the sale. . . ."); see also Francis v. White, 49 So. 334, 335 (Ala. 
1909) (court intervention appropriate and necessary if validity of redemption is disputed 
between purchaser and redemptioner). In fact, it is well accepted that a sheriffs sale 
purchaser has the right to challenge the redemptioner's right to redeem. Robertson v. 
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Moline, Milburn & Stoddard Wagon Co., 55 N.W. 495, 496 (Iowa 1893). This right 
continues until the sheriffs sale purchaser accepts the tendered redemption money. 
Casserleigh v. Spar ConsoL Mining Co., 128 P. 863, 866 (Colo. Ct. App. 1912). Here, 
Reott has preserved his right to challenge Wasatch's attempted redemption, by timely 
objecting and by rejecting the tendered redemption payment. (Fact fflf 86, 87, R. 5415.) 
The Robertson court's analysis of a purchaser's rights is particularly instructive: 
When appellant purchased said lot at the sale on execution, he took 
it subject only to redemption from the sale by the persons and in 
the manner authorized by statute. If those entitled to redeem failed 
to do so within the time and in the manner provided, the lot became 
his absolutely. He might surely question the right of one not 
authorized to redeem to do so, and ask that an attempted 
redemption be set aside as a cloud upon his title. For the same 
rea_sons he may question a redemption by one authorized to 
redeem, who does not do so within the time allowed. 
Robertson, 55 N.W. at 496 (emphasis added). 
Like the judgment creditor in Robertson, Reott, as the Sheriffs Sale purchaser and 
the recipient of the Sheriffs Deed, took the property subject only to a redemption by one 
actually authorized to redeem. As such, Reott has the legal right to challenge the validity 
of Wasatch's claim to title and by disputing Wasatch's claim that it is entitled to redeem. 
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C. Brockbank Does Not Apply To The Facts Of This Case Because 
Mission Did Not Transfer Its Personal Right To Redeem to Wasatch; It 
Transferred (Or Attempted To Transfer) Its Real Property Interest. 
Wasatch asserts that "the trial court committed error in permitting Reott to allege 
fraud to defeat redemption." (Appellants' Br. 27).7 In making this argument, Wasatch 
interprets Brockbank v. Brockbank to stand for the proposition that a fraudulent transfer 
can never be asserted to defeat redemption. Brockbank does not so hold. 
Brockbank is a divorce case. In Brockbank, the ex-wife claimed that her 
ex-husband fraudulently transferred his personal right of redemption to a third-party. 
2001 UT App. 251, at 1}7. In this case, Mission did not transfer its personal right of 
redemption to Wasatch. Mission transferred (or attempted to transfer) the Section 32 
Leases to Wasatch in June 2000. Reott claims that it is this June 2000 transfer of the 
"real property," including the Section 32 Leases, that was a fraudulent transfer, not the 
personal right of redemption that arose after the Sheriffs Sale in August 2001. 
Brockbank clearly holds that the transfer of the personal right of redemption cannot be a 
fraudulent transfer. Id. at \ 12 (personal rights of redemption are not subject to execution 
to collect a judgment). It does not, however, support Wasatch's argument that Reott 
cannot challenge the validity of Wasatch's title to the real property leases. 
The Brockbank court also ruled that Mrs. Brockbank waived objection to the 
redemption because she had accepted the $15,000 redemption amount and had applied it 
to the judgment. Id. at ^ 16. In this case, Reott rejected the redemption payment and 
7
 Reott did not allege fraud; Reott alleged fraudulent transfer which is similar but not the 
same as fraud. Fraudulent transfer is governed by both statutory and common law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-1. et seq. (1998 & Supp. 2006); See Points III and IV, infra. 
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immediately filed an Objection to Wasatch's redemption, asserting that Wasatch was not 
a proper party to redeem. (Fact f 87, R. 5415.) Therefore, Reott did not waive objection 
to redemption. 
Brockbank stands for the narrow proposition that the "Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act does not apply to the circumstances of [the Brockbank] case," i.e., the 
transfer of the personal right of redemption, along with an acceptance of the redemption 
payment. Id. at \ 19. These are not the facts here. Brockbank does not apply. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED IN RULING 
THAT WASATCH IS NOT A SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST TO 
MISSION, DOES NOT HAVE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO 
THE SECTION 32 LEASES, AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO REDEEM 
Both Wasatch and Reott agree that Wasatch's right to redeem the Section 32 
Leases arises only if this Court concludes that Wasatch is a "successor-in-interest" to 
Mission. See Rule 69(j), Utah R. Civ. P. Wasatch's only basis for claiming successor-in-
interest status is its claim that it acquired either legal or equitable title to Mission's 
interest in the Section 32 Leases prior to the Sheriffs Sale. If Wasatch acquired neither 
legal nor equitable title to the leases from Mission, it has no lawful right to redeem. See 
Winter Park Devil's Thumb Invt. Co. v. BMSP'ship., 926 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Colo. 1996) 
{en banc) ("Those holding a legal or equitable claim in the property have the right to 
redeem.. . . [0]ne who has no interest in the land has no right to redeem."); Forty-Four 
Hundred East Broadway Co. v. 4400 East Broadway, 660 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) ("A successor in interest has been defined as the one who has acquired or 
succeeded to the interest of the judgment debtor in the property."). 
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A. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Assignments Of The 
Section 32 Leases Signed By Justin Sutton And Not By Mission Did Not 
Convey Legal Title To Wasatch As A Matter Of Law. 
The only conveyance documents Wasatch has ever produced to support the claim 
to legal "title" to the Section 32 Leases are the three SITLA Mineral Lease Assignment 
Forms ("Assignments"). (Appellant's Br., Tab F.) The documents speak for themselves. 
There is no dispute about what is on the face of the documents. Each Section 32 Lease 
assignment is signed only by Justin C. Sutton individually, with no reference to a 
representative capacity. (Fact ffij 35, R. 5405.) Mission's name does not appear in the 
body of the assignment and it is not identified as the "grantor." (Fact f 35, R. 5405.) 
Based on these undisputed facts, and the fact that Sutton is not in the chain of title 
(Fact 1f 36, R. 5405), the District Court properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the 
Assignments were "wild deeds," and that without clearly identifying Mission (the 
business) as the grantor, the wild deeds did not convey Mission's interests in the Section 
32 Leases to Wasatch. (R. 4814.) See also Hyland v. Kirkman, 498 A. 2d 1278, 1284 
(NJ. Super. Ct. 1985). 
The District Court correctly rejected Wasatch's argument that the failure to 
identify "Mission" as grantor and Sutton's corporate capacity to sign was merely a 
technical defect. (R. 4814.) Utah law is clear that interests in non-extracted minerals are 
interests in real property. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-1(3). Any attempts to convey such 
interests must (i) be expressed in writing, and (ii) clearly identify the grantor, particularly 
when that grantor is a business or other entity. See §§ 57-1-12 and 57-1-13; see also 
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Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Utah 1982) (holding that where it is not clear that 
a corporate officer signs a contract in a representative capacity, he is personally liable). 
The District Court properly rejected Wasatch's request to liberally construe Rule 
69's "successor-in-interest" requirement, and allow it to redeem in spite of the defects. 
The District Court noted that even a liberal construction cannot overcome the fact that the 
Assignments "did not comply with a basic rule of conveyances, i.e., the assignor must be 
clearly identified." (R. 4814.) For these reasons, the District Court should be affirmed in 
ruling that Wasatch does not have legal title to the Section 32 Leases.8 
1. Principles Of Equity Dictate That Wasatch Is Not Entitled To 
Reform The Lease Assignments To Effect The Conveyance Of 
The Section 32 Leases, And By Judicial Fiat Finish The 
Fraudulent Transfer. 
Because the Section 32 Lease Assignments convey only Sutton's interest in the 
Section 32 Leases, the only way to correct what Wasatch described below as a 
"technical" title defect and insert "Mission" as the grantor is to request that a court 
reform the Assignments. As Reott argued below, reformation is not an option. 
It is not an option because Wasatch has never asserted a reformation claim against 
Mission. Even if it had, reformation is an equitable remedy that cannot be granted to one 
with "unclean hands." Hone v. Hone, 2004 UT App. 241, f7 , 95 P.3d 1221, 1223 
Wasatch argues an earlier SITLA assignment of the Section 32 Leases is also defective, 
as it is signed by an individual. (Appellants' Br. 7,33 n.13.) The 1997 White River-to-
Mission transfer is neither relevant nor material to issues before this Court. That transfer 
was and is not challenged. The SITLA assignment form is signed by "Kevin Williams, 
Manager." (See Appellants' Br., Ex. D.) There is a properly executed and recorded 
conveyance document—bill of sale and assignment—documenting White River's transfer 
to Mission of the Section 32 Leases, among others. (R. 3157 at«[[ 5, 4395 at n.13.) 
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(quoting Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1961)) ("A party who seeks an equitable 
remedy must have acted in good faith and not in violation of equitable principles," which 
includes fraud and deceit); Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984) ("[T]he 
party seeking reformation must have an equity superior to that of [the person] against 
whom reformation is sought."). Further, reformation is not a remedy if it adversely 
impacts the rights of an innocent third party. Id. at 1273. 
A "court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from 
circumstances which he has created," Battistone v. American Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 
837, 839 (Utah 1980). Given the circumstances here, the undisputed facts supporting 
fraudulent transfer and the impact on third party, reformation is not an option. 
B. The District Court Correctly Ruled That Wasatch Does Not Have 
Equitable Title In The Section 32 Leases. 
Wasatch's interest in the Section 32 Leases exists only because of a fraudulent 
transfer. The transaction was tainted ab initio, and no equitable rights were created. 
Nonetheless, Wasatch asks this Court to rule that, even if Wasatch obtained the Section 
32 Leases by fraudulent transfer, it should still be allowed to redeem. It argues here, as it 
did below, that it has the right to redeem, as Mission's successor-in-interest, by virtue of 
SITLA's approval of Assignments, the "enforceable" June 2000 Letter, which was 
supported by "sufficient consideration," and Mission's clear intent to convey. 
(Appellants' Br. 30-39.) The District Court properly rejected Wasatch's arguments 
below. This Court should affirm the District Court's ruling and do the same. 
24 
1. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Wasatch Has No 
Equitable Title In The Section 32 Leases Because It Obtained Its 
Interest Through A Fraudulent Transfer, 
A review of the briefs below show: Wasatch did not dispute the majority of the 
facts Reott proposed as undisputed (R. 4080-4085), notwithstanding that Reott identified 
many of them as facts specifically supporting fraudulent transfer. (R. 2678-2685). 
Wasatch did not deny or oppose Reott's fraudulent transfer claim on summary judgment. 
Wasatch did not challenge Reott's statement of Utah law regarding fraudulent transfer 
and, most importantly, did not challenge Reott's application of the facts to the law, i.e., 
that the facts establish up to eleven badges of fraud. (See generally R. 3662-3671, 4073-
4107.) As such, the District Court agreed with Reott's analysis and ruled that Wasatch 
conceded fraudulent transfer. (R. 4815.) Additionally, as discussed below in Point IV, 
the undisputed facts show that, as a matter of law, Wasatch obtained its interest in the 
Section 32 Leases by a fraudulent transfer. 
In Olsen v. Bank of Ephraim, 68 P.2d 195, 198 (Utah 1937), the Utah Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the argument that a transferee of a fraudulent conveyance 
obtains an equitable interest in property, reasoning: 
No such title can arise or be established from acts contrary to 
public policy nor in favor of the guilty party out of acts which have 
their origin in a fraudulent purpose. . . . It is a universal rule that 
no one can claim a right through the fraud of himself or another. 
The rule is founded upon honesty and fair dealing and courts of 
equity do not permit the parties to such transactions to reap any 
benefits therefrom. The law will not permit a party to deliberately 
put the property out of his control, or the title thereto in another, for 
a fraudulent purpose, and then, through the intervention of a court 
of equity, to regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been 
accomplished. . . , Such conveyances are binding upon him and 
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all parties in privity with him. A court of equity will not lend its 
aid to relieve a party from the consequences of his fraud, but will 
leave him where his fraudulent undertaking has placed him. 
Id. (emphasis added). Equity does not allow a party, "innocent or not," to reap the 
benefits of a fraudulent conveyance, because "[i]t is generally accepted that he who seeks 
equity must do equity." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984), abrogated on 
other grounds by RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935. 
The genesis of Wasatch's claim to title in the Section 32 Leases is a fraudulent 
transfer. Under Utah law, Wasatch, and BBC, can have no equitable interest in property. 
As such, the District Court's ruling that Wasatch has no equitable title in the Section 32 
Leases should be affirmed. 
2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That SITLA's 
Approval Had No Legal Effect On The Validity Of The Section 
32 Lease Assignments 
Wasatch contends the District Court failed to attach significance to SITLA's 
approval of the Assignments. (Appellant's Br. 33-34.) Wasatch, however, cites no 
authority to support its contention that SITLA's approval matters in title disputes. 
Interests in oil and gas estates owned by the State of Utah are administered by 
SITLA and are granted by lease. Utah Code Ann. §§ 65A-6-1 through 12 (2000); Utah 
Admin. Code R850-20-2200.5 (2003). SITLA is not and does not hold itself out as a title 
repository or as a county recorder. SITLA (like its federal counterpart BLM) oversees its 
mineral interests, excl usively for SITLA's own purposes. SITLA requires all lease 
transfers to be approved; SITLA, however, cannot withhold approval of properly 
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executed conveyances.9 See Utah Admin. Code R850-20-2200.5(b)(i) ("The director shall 
not withhold approval" of properly executed transfer, appearing to comply with law, with 
required filing fee)). The approval requirements are purely ministerial and serve 
SITLA's internal administrative needs. See Devon Energy Corp. v. United States, 45 
Fed. CI. 519, 530-31 (Fed. Cls. 1999) (discussing BLM's approval provisions). It 
ensures that a "responsible party" is of record (for notice purposes) and accountable for 
royalties, rentals and lease obligations. See id The approval requirements, however, do 
not impact "substantive property interests." See id; see also 58 C.J.S. Mines and 
Minerals § 139 (2002). Courts of law, not SITLA, determine legal title. 
SITLA's approval of a lease assignment, as between two private parties, has no 
bearing on the validity of the transfer. SITLA's approval cannot breathe life into an 
otherwise invalid transfer and or create an equitable interest, where none existed. 
Logically, SITLA's treatment of Wasatch as the new lessee is simply irrelevant.10 
9
 In approving lease transfers, SITLA is not making any legal determination about the 
validity of conveyance. Even if he or she is, the agency's decision as to the legal validity 
of the assignments would be subject to de novo review. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-
15(l)(a) and 63-46b-16(l) (1957); Vali Convalescent & Care Inst v. Division of Health 
Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("When reviewing pure questions of 
law, courts generally apply the 'correction-of-error' standard and accord the agency 
decision no particular deference."). 
10
 Wasatch asserts Reott "voiced no objection" to SITLA's treating Wasatch/BBC as the 
lessee of the Section 32 Leases. (Appellants' Br. 33.) This assertion is baseless and made 
for first time on appeal. The Section 32 case file at SITLA contains Reott correspondence 
regarding the improper Assignments. There is documentation of SITLA's decision to 
allow the courts to resolve title. In fact, due to Reott's communication with SITLA and 
the BLM (First Amendment right), Wasatch and BBC sued Reott for intentional 
interference with business relations. That claim was dismissed below in a separate 
summary judgment ruling, also entered on December 16, 2005. (R. 4802.) 
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3. The June 2000 Letter Does Not Grant An Equitable Interest In 
the Section 32 Leases. 
Wasatch asserts that the June 2000 Letter supports redemption and overcomes any 
"belated claim of fraud" because the letter has not harmed Reott or any other creditor and 
because no one, with the exception of Reott, has questioned it. (Appellants' Br. 35-36.) 
Therefore, it must be valid. Wasatch's argument is unconvincing. 
The reality is that Mission's creditors did not question the validity of the June 
2000 Letter because none of them know about it. The June 2000 Letter is an agreement, 
not a conveyance document.11 The June 2000 Letter was never recorded. {See Abstract 
of Title, R. 3155-3382). The Section 32 Lease Assignments were not recorded in the 
Carbon County Recorder's office until well after Wasatch sued Reott to quiet title. 
(R. 5419, \ 103.) And, Sutton directed Wasatch to keep quiet about the transfers. Just 
two months after the June 2000 Letter, on August 22, Sutton (Mission) sent a letter to 
Cusick (Wasatch) stating: 
There are several creditors with outstanding issues ... specifically 
Ed Reott... I must advise your offices to refer any similar creditor 
or legal calls directly to my attention. Further, given the 
confidentiality of the agreements entered into between our 
companies, I would request that no verbal or written information be 
sent to anyone without prior written permission from Mission 
Energy. 
11
 Wasatch did not argue in the District Court that the June 2000 Letter should be 
equitably converted into an equitable interest in land. Wasatch did not pursue this theory 
and did not cite to any equitable conversion cases below. While this Court should reject 
any suggestion that the June 2000 Letter should be converted into an equitable interest in 
land, where it was never argued below, under the circumstances, Wasatch is not entitled 
to "equity." 
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(R. 5419, % 104, emphasis added). Further, there is no evidence that any other Mission 
creditor knew about the June 2000 Letter. Finally, Wasatch's conclusory assertion that 
the June 2000 Letter did not harm Reott or any creditors is without merit, without support 
in the record and is the very reason why Utah has a fraudulent transfer act.12 
4. Wasatch Cannot Establish Mission's Intent To Assign Its 
Interests to Wasatch In The Section 32 Leases. 
In an effort to establish an equitable interest in the Section 32 Leases, Wasatch 
asserts "there can be no genuine dispute that Mission intended to convey the Section 32 
[Leases] to Wasatch." (Appellants' Br. 31.) There is no evidence to support Mission's 
intent. 
a. Mission's Intent With Regard to Disposing of Company 
Assets is Clearly Stated In It's Operating Agreement. 
The undisputed facts do not show that Mission intended to sign the June 2000 
Letter or to execute the Section 32 Lease Assignments. Mission's Operating Agreement, 
Section 5.2 requires four managers, the majority vote of three managers and the signature 
of two managers in order to dispose of company assets. (R. 2883-84.) Absent evidence 
that at least three managers of Mission approved the purported Assignments to Wasatch, 
there is no evidence that Mission, as opposed to Sutton, "intended" to execute the June 
2000 Letter and transfer Mission's interests in the Section 32 Leases. Both are signed 
only by Sutton. 
12
 Wasatch cites Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 1999 UT 34, ^j20, 976 P.2d 
1213, 1218, for the proposition that a plaintiff, who is not a party to or beneficiary of, an 
agreement has no standing to object to "modification of agreement." Reott does not 
disagree. Reott, however, is not requesting any modification to the June 2000 Letter. 
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Based on the plain language of Mission's Operating Agreement, Reott asserts that 
Sutton did not have actual authority, alone, to dispose of any property. Wasatch asserts 
that Sutton had "apparent authority." It is well settled law that the apparent authority of 
an agent can be inferred only from the acts and conduct of the principal. Bank of Salt 
Lake v. Corporation of President of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 534 
P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). The focus of an apparent authority inquiry is on the conduct 
of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a third party to believe that the 
agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 27 (1957). An agent does not have apparent authority merely because it looks 
so to every person with whom he deals. "It is the principal who must cause third parties 
to believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority." Bodell Const. Co. v. Stewart 
Title Guar. Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). It follows that one who deals 
exclusively with an agent has the responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite 
the agent's representations. Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79-80 (Utah 1982). 
Here, Sutton did not possess actual or apparent authority to convey Mission's 
property. There is no evidence that the principal, Mission, performed any act granting 
authority to Sutton to convey property in contravention of the Operating Agreement. 
Wasatch, in dealing exclusively with only one agent of Mission, had the responsibility to 
ascertain whether Sutton in fact had authority to convey the property in question. 
Wasatch did not and cannot prove Mission's intent as to how it will dispose of its 
property is other than as stated in the Operating Agreement. 
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b. The June 2000 Letter and the Assignments Do Not Convey 
Mission's Intent to Convey It's Property. 
In construing conveyance documents, Utah courts look to the four-corners of the 
documents to ascertain the grantor's intent. RHN Corp., 2004 UT 60, f^ 40; see also 
Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1938) (extrinsic evidence 
considered only where documents are ambiguous or unclear). Here, the June 2000 Letter 
and the Assignments are signed only by Sutton. The documents clearly evidence 
Sutton's intent (as opposed to Mission's) intent to transfer Mission's interest in the 
Section 32 Leases. 
Where a corporate officer executes documents in his own name, without any 
indication of agency, courts presume that the individual intended to sign in his individual 
capacity. See Colonial Film & Equip. Co. Inc. v. MacMillan Prof I. Magazines, Inc., 252 
S.E. 2d 61, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) ("One who executes a note in his own name with 
nothing on the face of the note showing his agency cannot introduce parol evidence to 
show that he executed for a principal"); see also Silva v. Holme, 241 P.2d 21, 24 (Cal. Ct. 
App. IstDist. 1952). 
5. The June 2000 Letter Is Not Supported By "Sufficient 
Consideration." 
Wasatch asserts that the June 2000 Letter was supported by "sufficient 
consideration." (Appellants' Br. 36-39.) The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Wasatch, show that Wasatch did not pay "sufficient consideration," let alone 
consideration that qualifies as "reasonably equivalent value." Wasatch's arguments as to 
the sufficiency of consideration fail for numerous reasons. 
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First, Wasatch attempts to bolster the amount of consideration paid, beyond what 
it argued below. Wasatch identifies five types of consideration, when it only discussed 
three below (Appellants' Br. 9-10.; Wasatch Opp. 16-17, R. 4101-02.) Each claim of 
"consideration," nonetheless, is addressed in turn: (1) While Wasatch asserts that it 
reimbursed Mission for $3,629.40 for "rentals" paid on certain leases, Wasatch never 
produced the cashed check that it claims to have issued, notwithstanding Reott's 
request.13 Further, "reimbursement" for lease rentals is not "consideration." It is 
"reimbursement." (2) Wasatch asserts that it accepted future SITLA and BLM financial 
obligations with respect to the leases, and asserts that it has paid $4,560. Lease 
obligations due to SITLA and BLM are not consideration to Mission. It is an obligation 
paid to SITLA to maintain the lease. This $4,590 figure is presented for the first time on 
appeal, obviously includes monies paid after Wasatch's attempted redemption, and 
should be disregarded. (3) Wasatch argues that it gave Mission the right to participate in 
a drilling deal, // Wasatch put one together. It is undisputed that Wasatch never put 
together a drilling deal, and admitted that it was never obligated to do so. (Fact ffif 51-52, 
R. 5408.) Instead, it sold the property to BBC in April 2002. (Fact ffi 90-93, R. 5416-
17.) (4) Wasatch argues for the first time that it "fronted" costs to get some of the leases 
13
 Although Todd Cusick, president of Wasatch, testifies that "WOGC paid $3,629.40 to 
Mission Energy as reimbursement for rental payments made on leases . . . ," {see 
Affidavit of Todd Cusick ("Cusick Affidavit") at 2-3, \ 2, Appellants' Br. Tab H), there 
is no evidence in the record to support this statement. The Reott Parties asked Wasatch 
to provide a copy of the cancelled check or some other objective evidence of payment in 
the course of discovery and received nothing in response. Tellingly, Mr. Cusick did not 
attach to his affidavit a copy of the cancelled check or a bank statement to independently 
verify its claim it reimbursed Mission. 
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in good standing. (Appellants' Br. at 9-10.) While Reott disagrees with Wasatch's 
interpretation of the June 2000 Letter, this is pure argument. Wasatch has provided no 
evidence that it in fact made any such payments, or that Mission either did or did not pay 
Wasatch back. As such, this argument for additional consideration should be disregarded. 
(5) Wasatch cites Territorial Savings for the proposition that the assumption of 
antecedent debts is valuable consideration. The June 2000 Letter does not show that 
Wasatch assumed any of Mission's old debts and there is no evidence that it did. 
(Appellants' Br. Tab E.) To the contrary, a full reading of the letter reveals that Wasatch 
clearly is protecting itself from Mission's debts. 
Second, Wasatch has never attempted to affirmatively prove that the consideration 
paid under the June 2000 Letter was sufficient in any way. Wasatch has never provided 
to this Court any analysis of the value of all the property it obtained in comparison to the 
consideration that it alleges it paid. It merely has argued that it paid something. 
Something does not mean "reasonably equivalent value," and without reasonably 
equivalent value, the transfer was fraudulent and there is no equitable interest. 
Third, the District Court correctly concluded that the promise to allow Mission to 
participate in a drilling deal that Wasatch "may be able," but is not obligated, to put 
together is not consideration. (R. 4815) Wasatch admits it had no obligation to actually 
pursue this drilling deal, choosing instead to transfer its interests in the leases to BBC, the 
promise, insofar as it was a promise at all, was illusory and unperformed, and cannot 
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constitute "reasonably equivalent value" under Utah law.14 See Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
4(1) ("[V]alue does not include an unperformed promise made other than in the ordinary 
course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person."). 
See also Resource Mgmt Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 
1036-37 (Utah 1985) ("When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement 
made in such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to 
nothing, the alleged 'promise5 is said to be 'illusory.' An illusory promise, neither binds 
the person making i t . . . , nor functions as consideration for a return promise."). 
On appeal, Wasatch asserts that because the drilling deal never happened, there 
was merely a "failure of consideration," not a lack of consideration. (Appellants' Br. 38.) 
Wasatch is wrong because, based on Wasatch's 30(b)(6) deposition testimony, Wasatch 
The illusory nature of the promise is highlighted by the 30(b)(6) deposition of 
Wasatch: 
Q: And were you ever able to obtain a drilling deal? 
A: No. Well, rather than doing a drilling deal we sold it all.... 
Q: So did you give Mission any consideration back for its interest in 
your prospective drilling deal? 
A: Why would we do that? 
Q: They got nothing for that part of the contract? 
A: They got the right to participate in a drilling deal that never 
happened.... 
Q: And you didn't provide Mission any consideration for that failure as 
a result of the Bill Barrett transaction? 
A: The deal is self-explanatory. You can see there was no 
consideration for that event if we were to sell it all What they wanted 
was the right to participate in a drilling deal if it happened, and it didn't 
happen and so that's what they got. They got what they asked for. 
(Emphasis added). Wasatch 30(b)(6) Dep. at 175:17-178:8 (Fact % 53, R. 5408.) 
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made clear that it never had an obligation to obtain a drilling deal. (See Wasatch 30(b)(6) 
Dep., Fact % 53.) As such, there was a lack of consideration from the beginning. 
Fourth, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wasatch, and assuming 
that the $3,629.40 was paid, it is insufficient to constitute "reasonably equivalent 
value."15 As Reott argued below, Wasatch acquired ten leases pursuant to the June 21, 
2000 Letter, covering at least 7,020 net acres of land. (See Reott Reply, viii-ix, R. 4363-
64; Affidavit of Don Stinson, at <f 3, R. 4419.). Wasatch argued that Wasatch offered to 
pay Mission five dollars ($5) per acre for the leases, in lieu of the drilling deal. (See 
R. 4083-84.) Taking Wasatch's own evidence, the leases have a minimum value of at 
least $35,100 ($5.00 per acre x 7020 acres). Considering the facts in the light most 
favorable to Wasatch, a payment of $3,629.40 is but 10.34% of Wasatch's proposed 
value of just the leases transferred, without any consideration given to taking over APDs 
and the Jack's Canyon operations. Such minimal compensation does not, as a matter of 
Utah law, constitute "reasonably equivalent value." See Meyer v. General Am. Corp., 
569 P.2d 1094, 1098 (Utah 1977) (quoting Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros Assn.., 70 
P.2d 738, 742 (Utah 1937) ("Fair equivalent has been deemed to mean 'such a price as a 
capable and diligent businessman could presently obtain for the property after conferring 
15
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5(2)(h) (actual intent to defraud may be inferred from the 
fact that "the value of the consideration received by the debtor was [not] reasonably 
equivalent to the value of the assets transferred"); id. § 25-6-6 (transfer is fraudulent if 
"debtor made the transfer . . . without receiving a reasonably equivalent value" and "was 
insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result"). 
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with those accustomed to buy such property. . . .' [It has been] determined that 13% of 
the property's proven worth is not a fair equivalent.")-16 
As such, this Court should affirm the District Court's determination that the June 
2000 Letter, was not supported by any consideration. In the alternative, this Court should 
affirm on grounds that Wasatch did not provide sufficient consideration to support an 
"equitable" interest in the Section 32 Leases, and other interests, because the 
consideration Wasatch paid was not "reasonably equivalent" to the value of the property 
it received under the June 2000 Letter. 
6. Liberal Construction Of Rule 69 Is For The Benefit Of One 
Legally Entitled To Redeem, Not To Liberally Grant Someone 
The Right To Redeem. 
Wasatch cites several cases, arguing that Rule 69 should be liberally construed to 
effect the remedial goals of redemption. See, e.g., Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. Gavilan 
Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The problem is that Wasatch cites 
no court that so liberally construes Rule 69 as to allow a redemption, under the 
extraordinary circumstances here. Wasatch claims to be the successor-in-interest to 
Mission, which stopped doing business shortly after Wasatch received its property. The 
only conveyance document reflecting the transfer of the Section 23 Lease is defective, 
and conveys no legal title. The property it wishes to redeem was obtained through a 
fraudulent transfer. There is no equitable title. There is a June 2000 Letter, but the 
sufficiency of the consideration is disputed, if any was actually paid. 
16
 BBC paid Wasatch significantly more. Those amounts are filed in the sealed Record 
pursuant to a confidentiality order, but are found in the sealed portions of the Record at 
(R. 4364.) 
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wasatch, the best fact for 
Wasatch is that Reott bid $1.00 at the sheriffs sale. Regardless of the amount, liberal 
construction of Rule 69 should benefit persons who properly acquire legal or equitable 
title or the right of redemption. Liberal construction should not eviscerate the clear 
requirement that a party entitled to redeem must be a successor-in-interest, with either 
legal or equitable title. Rule 69 should not be applied to judicially sanction an undisputed 
fraudulent transfer. 
7. Even If Legal Title Could Be Established, It Should Be Voided 
As A Result Of The Fraudulent Transfer 
Even assuming arguendo that Wasatch somehow acquired legal title, such title 
should be voided as a result of the fraudulent transfer. Utah law is clear that a fraudulent 
transfer is void as to the creditors, and that the transferee is divested of legal title in the 
event such a transfer is proved. See Meyer, 569 P.2d at 1098 ("When a conveyance is 
found void under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, it is treated as if the transaction 
never took place at all"); Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1261 (Utah 1987) ("The 
remedy provided by the Act for a fraudulent conveyance is voiding the conveyance."). 
For the reasons set forth in Point IV, this Court could affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on alternative grounds that Wasatch's title is void, as a matter of law. 
POINT IV, THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, WASATCH RECEIVED ITS INTEREST IN 
THE SECTION 32 LEASES, AND OTHERS, BY A FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER 
Below, Wasatch and BBC made a strategic decision not to directly attack or 
oppose Reott's fraudulent transfer claim. Instead, they argued that Reott lacked standing 
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both to challenge Wasatch's attempt to redeem and to assert a fraudulent transfer claim. 
Now, for the first time on appeal, Wasatch and BBC directly challenge Reott's fraudulent 
transfer claim. This Court should decline to consider this entirely new argument on 
appeal. Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d at 1022. Even if considered, they all fail. 
A. Fraudulent Transfer Can Be Resolved On Summary Judgment 
Wasatch and BBC assert that the District Court erred in resolving Reott's 
fraudulent transfer claim on summary judgment and without a trial.17 (Appellant's Br. 
20, 44.) Wasatch and BBC's contention is wrong, both as general proposition and based 
on the summary judgment briefs below. 
There is no authority for the blanket proposition that a fraudulent transfer claim 
can never be resolved on summary judgment. Wasatch and BBC cite selectively from 
Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Ba'ird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), to 
support their contention "that resolution of any issue of fraud on summary judgment 
generally constitutes legal error." (Appellant's Br. 44.) Territorial Savings, however, 
does not stand for this proposition. Rather, it stands for the unremarkable proposition 
that resolution of a fraudulent transfer claim (like any other claim) on summary judgment 
is improper when there are disputed issues of material fact. 781 P.2d at 462-63 
(summary judgment denied where defendant properly raised facts and disputes and 
17
 Wasatch and BBC did not make this argument during the course of the summary 
judgment proceedings. It was only after the court ruled in Reott's favor on fraudulent 
transfer, after Reott proposed a Statement of Undisputed Facts, and after Wasatch and 
BBC filed an objection to those facts, did Wasatch and BBC make this argument to the 
court, in a Motion to Supplement its Objections. (R. 4924.) The Motion to Supplement 
was denied. 
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contested badges of fraud and reversing summary judgment in light of identified factual 
disputes, conflicting affidavits and contested badges of fraud). See, e.g., Morganroth & 
Morganroth v. DeLorean, 213 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment 
of a fraudulent transfer). A fraudulent transfer claim is no different than any other claim 
and can be resolved on summary judgment. 
In this case, there was nothing to preclude the District Court from deciding Reott's 
fraudulent transfer claim on summary judgment. The material facts were not disputed. 
(R. 4080-85, 3665-68.) Reott's fraudulent transfer argument was unopposed. (See 
generally R. 4082-84, 3665-68.) As the non-moving party, Wasatch and BBC had the 
duty to assert any and all arguments it had to oppose Reott's fraudulent transfer claim and 
"the burden of coming forward with rebuttal evidence." Territorial Savings, 781 P.2d at 
462, n.18. And, because a single badge of fraud may be sufficient to prove a fraudulent 
transfer, Wasatch and BBC had the affirmative obligation to contest each and every one 
of Reott's alleged badges of fraud. Id. at 462 ("Often a single [badge of fraud] may 
establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent.")18 Wasatch and BBC, for whatever 
reason, elected not to. So, unlike the defendant in Territorial Savings, Wasatch and BBC 
did not defend against the fraudulent transfer claim or contest Reott's arguments that the 
facts supported up to eleven badges of fraud. 
!
* See also Taylor v. Rupp (In Re Taylor), 133 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(interpreting Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and holding single badge of fraud is sufficient 
to establish actual intent to defraud); see also Dahnken v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986) (affirming actual intent on three badges of fraud). 
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In such case, there was nothing improper about the District Court resolving 
Reott's fraudulent transfer claim on summary judgment and without a trial. 
B. The District Court Properly Concluded, Based on the Undisputed 
Facts And The Lack Of Any Opposition, That Wasatch and BBC 
Conceded The Existence of Nine Badges of Fraud. 
Wasatch argues that the District Court erred in concluding that it had conceded the 
existence of nine badges of fraud. (Appellant's Br. at 40.) A review of the summary 
judgment briefs below confirms that that is exactly what happened. Reott argued that 
Wasatch had received the Section 32 Leases (and eight other leases), as a result of a 
fraudulent transfer from Mission. Eleven pages of Reott's opening summary judgment 
brief are dedicated to discussing the law of fraudulent transfer, arguing how the 
undisputed facts establish 11 badges of fraud, and concluding that Wasatch obtained its 
interest in the Section 32 Leases by fraudulent transfer. (R. 2694-2711.) 
In their Reply/Opposition briefs, Wasatch made little, and BBC made no, effort to 
oppose Reott's claim that the Section 32 Leases had been fraudulently transferred under 
Utah law. (R. 3662-3671, 4073-4107.) They did not dispute the majority of the facts 
presented by Reott. They did not discuss, in-any significant way, Utah's fraudulent 
transfer statute or the case law interpreting it. They did not challenge that certain 
undisputed facts established nine badges of fraud. They did not argue that any of these 
facts were not "material" to the determination of any badge of fraud or to the conclusion 
of fraudulent transfer. At no time did Wasatch or BBC ever argue that these facts have a 
different meaning in the context of a fraudulent transfer claim or that these "innocuous" 
facts do not establish a fraudulent transfer. Finally, Wasatch and BBC did not argue that 
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there was no fraudulent transfer or that the Court could not decide the issue on summary 
judgment. Because Wasatch and BBC did not dispute the facts, and because they did not 
challenge the law or Reott's application of the law, Wasatch and BBC did not dispute that 
the property had been fraudulently transferred. As such, the District Court properly 
concluded that Wasatch and BBC did not dispute and in fact conceded the existence of 
nine badges of fraud.19 (See Ruling at 6, Tab A.) 
C The Undisputed Evidence Establishes Eleven Badges of Fraud. 
For the first time on appeal, Wasatch and BBC argue that the facts do not support 
Reott's analysis of eleven badges of fraud or the conclusion of fraudulent transfer. 
(Appellants' Br. at 13-17.) Wasatch and BBC's arguments, however, fail to prove that 
the evidence does not support even one badge of fraud. This Court need only conclude 
that the facts support at least one badge of fraud in order to affirm the lower court's entry 
of summary judgment. See Baird, 781 P.2d at 462 ("Often a single one of them may 
establish and stamp a transaction as fraudulent"); Taylor v. Rupp, 133 F.3d 1336, 1339 
(10th Cir. 1998) (interpreting Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and holding single badge of 
fraud is sufficient to establish actual intent to defraud); see also Dahnken v. Wilmarth, 
726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986) (affirming actual intent on three badges of fraud). 
19
 Reott argued below, in its Opposition/Cross Motion For Summary Judgment, that the 
facts supported 11 badges of fraud. In reviewing Wasatch and BBC's Reply/Opposition 
briefs, neither one addressed fraudulent transfer. Instead, Wasatch challenged the issue 
of Sutton's authority to transfer Mission's interest and the issue of consideration. 
Liberally construing Wasatch's response, Reott noted that Wasatch had challenged two of 
the badges of fraud, albeit without saying so. (R. 4378-79.) While Reott does not agree 
that Wasatch successfully knocked out two badges of fraud, nine of them went without 
even an acknowledgement. 
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To establish a fraudulent transfer under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(l)(a), a transfer 
must be made with the "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud." "Actual intent" is 
proven through the existence of certain factors, commonly referred to as "badges of 
fraud," which are codified at Section 25-6-5(2)(a) through (k) and discussed in Utah case 
law. The undisputed facts show up to eleven badges of fraud. 
Badge 1: Sutton Assigned the Section 32 Leases to WOGC after 
mechanics liens, foreclosure actions and judgments had been 
entered against Mission. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5(2)(d) and (j), Mission transferred the Section 32 
Leases after eleven mechanics liens were recorded against Mission's interest in the 
Section 32 Leases, (Fact 120, R. 5402), including the Key Energy and J-West Liens 
(Fact t l 20-22, 44, R. 5402, 5407), after the Key Energy and J-West foreclosure actions 
had been commenced (Fact til 25-26, R. 5403), after the J-West Judgment had been 
entered (Fact ffif 27, 45, R. 5403) and after Reott had sued and obtained a Colorado 
judgment against Mission (Fact f 19, R. 5401-02). On appeal, Wasatch asserts, without 
explanation, citation to legal authority or evidence, that the timing of the transfer is not 
material to a fraudulent transfer claim and the conveyance did not harm Reott or any 
other creditor. Contrary to Wasatch's argument, timing of a transfer is a badge of fraud. 
Badge 2: Sutton and WOGC carved up the ML43541 lease with the 
intent of evading the liens and judgments. 
A conveyance not made in the ordinary course of business may be considered a 
badge of fraud. See United States v. Christensen, 751 F. Supp. 1532, 1536 (D. Utah 
1990). The "carving up" and splitting ownership of the ML43541 Lease (560 acres, with 
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rights from surface to earth's center), horizontally and vertically, was not in the ordinary 
course. Mission retained a small forty-acre portion, with vertically limited rights from 
the surface down to 3,398 feet. (Fact ^ 41, R. 5406.) Wasatch obtained 520 acres, with 
rights from surface to earth center, in addition to the deep rights (from 3398 feet to center 
of the earth) beneath the forty acres upon which the Lavinia Well. (Fact f 41, R. 5406.) 
Wasatch then applied to SITLA to have its 520 acres renumbered to ML43541-A. 
Wasatch contends that in June 2001 it obtained ML43541-A (520 acres of former 
ML43541), the deep rights under ML43541 (3398 ft to earth's center) and ML43798 (80 
acres) free and clear of all liens. 
Further, Wasatch expressly admitted that the ML43541 Lease was divided with 
the intent to avoid liens. Wasatch knew about Mission's liens and liabilities. (Fact ft 21, 
22, 42, 43, R. 5402, 5406-07.) In its 30(b)(6) deposition, Wasatch testified that WOGC 
wanted title to the Section 32 Leases, but did not want the liability associated with them. 
(Fact f 42, R. 5406.) WOGC believed that the Lavinia Well was "more of a liability than 
it was of any value." (Fact 148, R. 5407.) WOGC determined, sua sponte, that the liens 
and the J-West judgment should only attach to the "valueless" Lavinia Well and the forty 
acres upon which it is located. (Fact fflf 46, 49, R. 5407.) In an attempt to evade liability 
for the liens and judgments, but obtain title to the Section 32 Leases, Mission and WOGC 
decided to "carve or fillet out that well and the forty acres that goes with it and move it 
aside." (Fact HI 41-48, R. 5406-07.) 
On appeal, Wasatch disagrees that dividing up the Section 32 Leases was intended 
to defraud creditors and asserts that Mission retained a "significant asset." Wasatch is 
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misleading. Wasatch's position throughout this entire litigation has been that by dividing 
up the Section 32 Leases, the liens only attached to the small forty-acre section that 
Mission retained, notwithstanding that the division and the renumbering of ML43541 
lease took place after the liens were recorded and judgments were obtained. (See 
Wasatch Complaint, R. 01-37.) In addition, by statutory definition, Mission was 
insolvent, because it was not paying its debts as they came due. Utah Code Ami. § 25-6-
3(2). And, this "significant asset" that Mission retained was described by Wasatch as a 
liability during its 30(b)(6) deposition (Fact ^  42, R. 5418). 
Badge 3: WOGC gave no value, or less than reasonably equivalent 
value, for the Section 32 Leases and the other leases received 
pursuant to the June 2000 Letter. 
Whether the transfer was made for "reasonably equivalent value" is a badge of 
fraud, under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(h). The sufficiency of the "consideration" is 
disputed. Reott discusses, under Point III,C,4, that Wasatch did not pay reasonably 
equivalent value for the property it received, which establishes another badges of fraud. 
Consideration, however, is but one of many. Even if this Court determines that 
consideration was sufficient, this Court can still affirm the District Court's ruling on 
fraudulent transfer, given the other badges of fraud which were not disputed. 
Badge 4: Mission was insolvent at the time of the June 2000 transfers, 
and substantially before. 
Solvency is a factor under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(i). Under the Act, "[a] 
debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed insolvent." 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-3 (1998). Mission was not paying its debts as they came due; 
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between 1998 and 2000, there were eleven mechanics liens, Reott's Colorado Judgment 
entered in December 1999, the Key Energy and J-West foreclosure actions, and the J-
West Judgment entered on May 22, 2000, just one month before the June 2000 Letter. 
(Fact 1f20-27, 96; R. 5402-03, 5417.) Moreover, Mission's accountant Bruce Hill 
testified that Mission was undercapitalized, had no ability to repay the Reott bridge loan 
when it was made in 1997, that its financial performance in 1998 was marginal and that 
debts were uncollectible in 1999. (Facts fflf 94, 95, R. 5417.) 
On appeal, Wasatch provided no evidence to contradict that Mission was insolvent 
at the time of the June 2000 Letter. Wasatch provided no evidence of Mission's or the 
Lavinia Well's value. Reott's expert report is not evidence; it is hearsay. Moreover, the 
report opines about the production capability of the Lavinia Well for purposes of 
damages for Wasatch and BBC's denial of pipeline access since 2001, not the Well's 
value or Mission's value. 
Badge 5: Pursuant to the June 2000 Letter, Mission essentially 
conveyed to WOGC the last of Mission's assets. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(e) considers whether the transfer is of substantially 
all of Mission's assets. Mission (or Sutton) conveyed (or attempted to convey) 
substantially all of its assets to WOGC in three transfers—in June 1999, May 2000 and 
June 2000. (Fact fflf 99-101, R. 5418.) The June 2000 Letter reflects the last of the three 
transfers. Thereafter, Mission had no assets, with the exception that Mission retained the 
"liability" of the Lavinia Well and a limited forty-acre section of the ML43541 lease, 
with rights limited to a depth of 3,398 feet. (Fact ffi[ 48-49, R. 5413-12.) On appeal, 
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Wasatch does not challenge badge 5. Wasatch does, however, assert that the Lavinia Well 
is now a 'significant asset" (Appellants' Br. 15), while in its 30(b)(6) deposition, Wasatch 
asserted the Lavinia Well was more of a "liability." (R. 5418.) 
Badge 6: Sutton Resigned and Mission Absconded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(f) considers whether the debtor absconded after the 
transfer. Less than four months after the June 2000 transfer, Mission and Sutton 
essentially disappeared. Effective October 1, 2000, Justin C. Sutton resigned as Manager 
of Mission. (Fact % 107, R. 5420.) Afterwards, Mission stopped doing business. 
On appeal, Wasatch argues that Fred Jager replaced Sutton as Mission's manager. 
Appellant's Br. at 16 (citing R. 3960, 4091.) This statement is misleading. The record at 
3960 is a page from Fred Jager's deposition and a portion of that deposition states: "You 
know I have never been involved in the operations of the company so I don't know what 
leases are left or anything like that." Below, Wasatch represented that "Mr. Jager was not 
a manager or member of Mission, and had no personal involvement with Mission's 
management at any relevant time." (R. 4079.) Further, Wasatch presented no evidence 
to contradict that Mission absconded and was no longer doing business. 
Badge 7: The Section 32 Lease Assignments, reflecting the wild 
conveyance from Sutton to WOGC, were not recorded, i.e., 
concealed. 
Concealing a transfer, see Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(c), and failing to record a 
conveyance, see United States v. Christensen, 751 F.Supp. 1532, 1536 (D. Utah 1990), 
are badges of fraud. Here, the undisputed facts show that the Section 32 Lease 
Assignments were not recorded in the Carbon County Recorder's office at the time of 
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several key events, including the foreclosure of Key Energy and J-West liens and 
Sheriffs Sale. (See Abstract of Title, R. 3155-3382.) They were not recorded until after 
Reott was sued for quiet title (Fact % 40, R. 5406) and after BBC had purchased the 
property from Wasatch in April 2002. As such, there was no public notice that Mission's 
interest in the Section 32 Leases had been transferred to Wasatch. 
On appeal, Wasatch addresses badges of fraud 7, 8 and 9 collectively. In 
response, Wasatch asserts that recording is not required by law and that it served no 
purpose. Wasatch, however, does not deny that the leases were not recorded with the 
County Recorders office, which is required as a matter of Utah law, if a party desires to 
protect itself from and give notice to third parties regarding any real property transfer. 
SITLA is not a county recorder. It maintains its leases for its own administrative 
purposes. Wasatch provides no authority to support its assertion that assignments of 
SITLA mineral leases are not recorded and such is "consistent with standard practices for 
State mineral leases." (Appellant's Br. 16.) 
Badge 8: Sutton executed the Section 32 Leases Lease Assignments in 
haste, without regard to Utah's title and recording laws, and 
without regard to Mission' own rules with regard to the 
disposal of company assets. 
Transfers that are not recorded, executed in secrecy and haste, and conveyed out 
of the ordinary course, see Christensen, 751 F. Supp. at 1536, are considered badges of 
fraud. Here, the Section 32 Lease assignments were signed by only by Sutton, were not 
properly executed (Sutton not Mission), not properly notarized (and therefore not 
recordable under Utah law), and not recorded (nor was any other document, like a Bill of 
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Sale and Assignment or Deed). (Fact 1f 30b, 30d, R. 5405.) Moreover, the transfer was 
not done in accordance with Mission's Operating Agreement, which requires the 
signature of two managers to dispose of Mission property. (Fact ^ 112, R. 5421.) 
On appeal, Wasatch collectively addresses badges of fraud 8 and 11. Wasatch 
does not deny that the Operating Agreement requires the signature of two managers. 
Wasatch asserts that Sutton was Mission's only manager. Assuming that he is, the 
Operating Agreement still requires two signatures to effect a conveyance, and if we 
assume that Mr. Jager was involved, in some way, he at least was available to provide a 
second signature. He, however, was not contacted in any way about the transfers, and 
had no idea that they had event taken place. Moreover, Wasatch has provided no 
affirmative evidence to support that Mission "ratified" any transfers. There is none. 
Badge 9: The June 2000 transfer to WOGC was concealed from 
creditors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(c) considers concealing transfers from creditors a 
badge of fraud. By letter dated, August 22, 2000, Sutton informed that Wasatch that 
there were "creditors with outstanding issues," and directed Wasatch to keep the 
agreements (the transfers) confidential, to not send any Mission creditor any information 
without Mission's prior written approval. (Fact ^ 104, R. 5419.) That same day, Sutton 
wrote a letter to Reott telling him Mission was protecting "the assets of the company" 
and working to "make the company successful." (Fact ^ 105, R. 5419.) In addition, in 
December 2000, after he had resigned and after all property had been conveyed, Sutton 
sent a letter, dated December 26, 2000, to J-West's counsel requesting J-West recognize 
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Mission's rights, but not disclosing the transfers, or attempted transfers of Sections 27, 
32, 33 and 34—the property covered by the J-West mechanics lien and resulting 
judgment. (Fact 1106, R. 5419-20.) 
On appeal, Wasatch asserts only that the Section 32 Leases were publicly 
available. Wasatch does not address, at all, the fact that Mr. Sutton's letters direct 
Wasatch to say nothing, while simultaneously leading Reott and other creditors to believe 
that Mission is still in business and "protecting assets." 
Badge 10: To further place the Section 32 Leases beyond the reach of 
creditors, WOGC Promptly Conveyed the Section 32 Leases, 
along with other former Mission property, to an affiliate 
Wasatch. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(a) and Christensen, 751 F. Supp. at 1536 consider 
transfers to insiders a badge of fraud. Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation and Wasatch Oil 
and Gas, L.L.C. are owned and operated by the same three people, Todd Cusick, Brian 
Watts and Mark Smoot. (R. 2672.) After obtaining the Section 32 Leases, WOGC 
promptly conveyed them to Wasatch, just eight days later, on July 1, 2000. (Fact % 59, 
R. 5410.) The conveyance, however, was not executed until October 27, 2000, just one 
day after the Reott Judgment is domesticated in Carbon County, and not recorded until 
November 27, 2000. Id. The transfer to an insider, combined with backdating the 
effective date of the conveyance appears to be an attempt by Wasatch to obtain some type 
of priority. On appeal, Wasatch asserts that the transfer was for "tax purposes." 
(Appellant's Br. 17.) No explanation is provided for the effective date of July 1, 2000, 
execution date of October 27, and recording date of November 27. 
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Badge 11: Under Mission's Operating Agreement, Sutton had no 
authority, on his own, to convey Mission's interests. 
Conveying property contrary to the dictates of Mission's governing Operating 
Agreement is ultra vires and out of the ordinary course, and is a badge of fraud. See 
Christensen, 751 F. Supp. at 1536. Wasatch did dispute Reott's contention that Sutton 
lacked authority, but not in the context of opposing fraudulent transfer. Mission's 
Operating Agreement expressly states that Mission cannot dispose of company assets 
without the signature of two managers. (Fact f 57, R. 5421.) The June 2000 Letter and 
the Section 32 Leases are signed only by Sutton. (Fact f34, R. 5405.) Viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Wasatch, even if Sutton is the only manager, and even if 
Jager is somehow still involved, the Operating Agreement still requires two signatures. 
Under Mission's Operating Agreement, Sutton had no authority, on his own, to give 
away the last remaining assets of Mission. 
The undisputed facts shows that the circumstances surrounding the June 2000 
transfer from Mission to Wasatch was suspicious and indeed motivated by the intent to 
avoid pre-existing liens, the foreclosure action, and the judgments. While the facts 
establish as many as eleven badges of fraud, this Court needs only one to confirm the 
District Court's ruling that Wasatch obtained its interest in the Section 32 Leases by 
fraudulent transfer. As such, Wasatch has no equitable title, as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Reott requests this Court affirm the District Court's Quiet Title Ruling and Order. 
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DATED this /7#-day of November, 2006. 
LAWRENCE E. STEVENS 
GARY E. DOCTORMAN 
DIANNA M. GIBSON 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Edward A. Reott, Goal, LLC 
and Regoal, Inc. 
<n 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of November, 2006,1 caused to be mailed, 
first class, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS, to: 
Eric C. Olson 
Matthew K. Richards 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. BOX 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Wasatch 
Carolyn Mcintosh 
David E. Brody 
PATTONBOGGS,LLP 
1600 Lincoln Street, Suite 1900 
Denver, Colorado 80264 
Nick Sampinos 
190 North Carbon Avenue 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorneys for Bill Barrett Corporation 
fflMtAA'T?) ¥ityc%n_ 
52 
ADDENDUM 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND F0R [ DEC 1 6 ?m 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C., A 
Utah Limited Liability Company, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
EDWARD A. REOTT, et al., 
Defendant's. 
GOAL, L.L.C., A Utah limited liability 
company, as the real party in interest to the 
rights of Edward Reott, Key Energy 
Lien and J-West Oilfield Lien, and 
REGOAL INC., A Pennsylvania 
Corporation, 
Counterclaim, Third Party 
and Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
WASATCH ODL & GAS., et al, 
Third Party, Counterclaim 
and Crossclaim Defendants. 
RULING ON WASATCH'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RE: REDEMPTION ISSUES 
AND 
RULING ON REOTT'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR QUIET TITLE, 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 
TRESPASS, CONVERSION, AND 
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS 
Civil No. 010700991 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
On April 15,2004, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment supported by 
a memorandum to which the defendant's filed a Memorandum in Opposition. The Reott 
defendants also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title, Fraudulent 
Conveyance. Each party filed a responsive memorandum and a Reply. Bill Barrett Corporation 
also filed a memorandum in opposition to the Reott Parties' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: Quiet Title, Fraudulent Conveyance and joined in the position advocated by the 
plaintiff Wasatch. The court heard oral argument, allowed counsel to submit post-hearing 
memorandum, and took the matter under advisement. 
I. Brief Factual Background 
Reott obtained a judgment against Mission Energy (hereinafter "Mission") and purchased 
two other judgments that had been previously obtained against Mission. Reott executed on the 
three judgments at a Sheriffs Sale on August 9,2001, which involved oil and gas interests in 
four section of land in Utah: 27, 32, 33 (collectively the "BLM" Leases) and portions of 32 (the 
"SITLA" Leases). Reott was the only bidder at the sale and bid $ 1.00. Wasatch, who claims it 
was the successor-in-interest to Mission prior to the Sheriffs Sale, filed with the court and sent 
two notices of redemption to Reott and tendered a check in the amount of $1.06, which includes 
interest, within the 6 month redemption period after the sale under Rule 69(j) URCP. The tender 
was rejected by Reott. 
On February 9,2002, Reott transferred his title to the Sheriffs Sale Properties to Regoal, 
Inc., and on March 6, 2002, the Sheriff of Carbon County signed a Sheriffs Deed to Regoal. 
By a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated April 30, 2002, BBC acquired all of Wasatch's right, 
title and interest in and to the Sheriffs Sale Properties. 
II. Issue Presented 
The main issue presented by the reciprocal motions for partial summary judgment is: Did 
Wasatch properly exercise a valid right of redemption with respect to the Sheriffs Sale 
Properties pursuant to Rule 69(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
III. Relief Sought by the Parties 
A. Wasatch: Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Wasatch") seeks a ruling that 
Wasatch held and validly exercised a right of redemption to certain oil and gas interests in 
Sections 27,33,34, and portions of Section 32 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"Sheriffs Sale Properties") which were acquired by the defendant Edward Reott (hereinafter 
"Reott") at a Sheriffs Sale on August 9,2001. Wasatch also requests a ruling that it holds title 
to the said oil and gas interests free and clear of any interest of the defendants by reason of its 
exercise of the right of redemption. 
B. Bill Barrett Corporation: In April of 2002, Bill Barrett Corporation (hereinafter "BBC") 
purchased the interests of Wasatch in the Sheriffs Sale Properties and therefore claims that it is 
the owner of the Sheriffs Sale Properties, less a 40 acre section of the Section 32 Leases and the 
Lavinia Well and all appurtenant equipment, pipelines, etc. BBC joins with Wasatch in urging 
the court to find that Wasatch was a successor-in-interest to Mission and that Wasatch properly 
exercised a right of redemption. 
C. Reott The Reott defendants urge the court to hold that neither Wasatch nor BBC has 
legal or equitable title to the Sheriffs Sale Properties because Wasatch was and is not a 
successor in interest to Mission and therefore cannot redeem the Sheriffs Sale Properties. Reott 
requests the court to quiet title to the Section 32 Leases in Reott. _ 
IV. Analysis 
At the outset, the court finds that Reott, as the purchaser at the sheriffs sale and the 
recipient of the sheriffs deed, received the property subject only to redemption by one actually 
authorized to redeem. As such, Reott has standing to challenge Wasatch's purported title and has 
standing to dispute Wasatch's claim that Wasatch was a lawful successor-in-interest to Mission. 
Because BBC acquired all of Wasatch's right, title, and interest in and to the Sheriffs Sale 
Properties, any consequence to Wasatch in this ruling should also be ascribed to BBC as 
Wasatch's successor. 
Parti. The BLM Leases 
The BLM owns the land underlying the leases in Sections 27, 33, and 34. BLM forms were 
used to transfer the leases in those sections to Wasatch in June of 1999, the transfers were 
approved by the BLM, and those leases were sold at the August 9,2001 Sheriffs Sale. The court 
finds that Wasatch is in the chain of title to those leases, which Reott does not dispute, and is a 
successor-in-interest to Mission with respect to the BLM Sections and, as such, had a right to 
redeem those properties from the Sheriffs Sale under the provisions of Rule 69(j). 
Reott concedes that Wasatch, and now its successor BBC, can redeem the BLM properties, 
but only if Wasatch pays the prior foil amount of the J-West lien, the Key Energy lien, and the 
judgment in favor of Reott, the combined total of which is approximately $280,000.00. 
The court finds, as a matter of law, that Reott's lien interests in the Sheriffs Sale properties 
are extinguished because the sale on a judgment exhausts it as to the property sold. The court 
finds that under Brockbank v. Brockbank. 32 P.3d 990 (Utah App. 2001) and Tech-Fluid Servs. 
Inc. V. Gavilan Operating, Inc.. 787 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the amount to be paid by 
Wasatch to redeem the BLM properties is the amount for which they were purchased by Reott at 
the Sheriffs Sale together with interest and any other costs required by the provisions of Rule 
690). 
Part Two: The SITLA Leases 
A resolution of the question whether Wasatch is a successor-in-interest to Mission for 
purposes of the SITLA Leases (Section 32, less the Lavinia 1-32 well and limited adjacent forty 
acres to a specified depth, which is not disputed by Wasatch) necessitates consideration of the 
following: 
A. Do the Three Mineral Lease Assignment Forms Executed by Justin Sutton 
Transfer Mission's Legal Title in the Section 32 Leases? 
The undisputed facts show that prior to any purported transfer to Wasatch, Mission was the 
lessee of record of the Section 32 Leases. It is also undisputed that Justin Sutton was a manager 
at Mission at the times relevant herein and that he himself held no interest in the Section 32 
Leases. 
Reott claims that Wasatch is not a successor in interest to Mission because Justin Sutton 
signed the three Mineral Lease Assignment Forms in favor of Wasatch on June 23,2000 in his 
own individual capacity and not as an agent for Wasatch. Further, Reott asserts that Wasatch 
paid no consideration for the transfers. 
Wasatch responds that Sutton, as the manager for Mission, signed the three mineral lease 
assignment forms on the Section 32 Leases as an agent for Mission even though his capacity as 
an agent or manager is not stated on the face of the assignment forms. Wasatch further claims 
that the failure to specifically designate his capacity is only a "technical" defect and is not fatal to 
Wasatch's title to the Section 32 Leases because: (1) the assignments were approved by SITLA 
despite the absence of Sutton's title; (2) the reverse side of each of the assignment forms contains 
a statement by Wasatch that it accepts the assignments; and (3) the June 21,2000 Letter 
Agreement signed two days before the assignments confirms the intent to transfer to Wasatch. 
The court finds as a matter of law that the failure to identify Sutton on the assignment forms 
as a person authorized to execute the assignments on behalf of Mission results in no title passing 
from Mission to Wasatch. Interests in non-extracted minerals are interests in real property, and 
any attempts to convey must be expressed in writing and clearly identify the grantor, particularly 
where the grantor is a business or corporate entity. Although Wasatch argues that the court 
should liberally construe the definition of successor-in-interest under Rule 69(j) to implement 
remedial policies for redemption, the court finds that even a liberal construction cannot overcome 
the fact that the conveyances from Mission to Wasatch did not comply with a basic rule of 
conveyances, i.e., the assignor must be clearly identified. 
Moreover, the approval by SITLA has no legal effect on the validity of the transfer and does 
not, of itself, yield a legal conclusion that title to the Section 32 Leases is vested in Wasatch. It is 
only an approval of the apparent transaction, which approval, under SITLA's regulations, cannot 
be withheld if the assignment is properly executed. Furthermore, the acceptance of the 
conveyance by Wasatch on the reverse side of the assignment forms only reflects Wasatch's 
intent to accept the conveyance - it does not reflect the intent of Mission to convey. 
In summary, the assignments from Sutton in his own capacity were equivalent to "wild 
deeds" and were therefore insufficient to transfer Mission's interests in the Section 32 Leases to 
Wasatch. 
II. Does the June 21,2000 Letter Agreement 
Convey Equitable Title to Wasatch? 
It is clear under Utah law that an equitable interest in property sold at a Sheriffs Sale would 
be sufficient to confer successor-in-interest status on Wasatch, and Wasatch claims such an 
interest in the Section 32 and other property (less the Lavinia well and adjacent acreage to a 
certain depth) by virtue of the June 21,2000 Letter Agreement. Reott disputes Wasatch's claim 
of equitable title on the basis of fraudulent conveyance. 
Utah law is clear that property transferred by fraudulent conveyance confers no equitable 
title. Beginning on page 12 of its memorandum, Reott cites 11 "Badges of Fraud" surrounding 
Mission's transfer of its interests in the Section 32 Leases to Wasatch. Wasatch, in its Reply, 
addresses only two of them and the court therefore finds that Wasatch concedes 9 of them. (See 
p. 3 of Reott's Reply memorandum). Utah case law indicates that even one badge of fraud is 
sufficient to invalidate a conveyance and the court therefore finds that Wasatch received no 
equitable title because of fraudulent conveyance. 
The court also finds that the June 21, 2000 Letter agreement does not convey equitable title 
to Wasatch because no consideration was ever paid. The Letter Agreement provided that 
Mission would transfer its interest in certain Leases , including the Section 32 Leases, in 
exchange for the right to participate in a drilling deal that Wasatch "may be able" to put together. 
An interest in a drilling deal that admittedly may not come to pass does not constitute 
consideration. 
In conclusion, although Wasatch argues that the June 21,2000 Letter Agreement cures any 
defect (failure to insert the title of "manager" or "agent") in the three Mineral Lease Assignment 
Forms and confers equitable title on Wasatch, the court finds the purported transfers were 
fraudulent and therefore conveyed no equitable or legal title to Wasatch. 
V. Trespass, Conversion, and Trespass to Chattels 
The Reott parties have had title to the Section 32 Leases since the February 9, 2002 when 
the Sheriffs Deed was issued. Subsequent to that date BBC developed Section 32 by drilling 
two wells and reported to Division of Oil, Gas and Mining that the two wells were producing gas 
as of December4 2003. The court therefore finds as a matter of law that BBC is liable for 
trespass as a result of the drilling of the two wells. The court also finds as a matter of law that 
BBC is liable to the Reott parties for any minerals converted on Reott's Section 32 Leases since 
February 9, 2002, with the amount to be determined at trial. 
The court also finds that BBC forcibly removed the Lavinia Pipeline which caused the meter 
house to be pulled off its foundation, bending the oil production line, and damaging the 
connection tp the oil tank causing an oil spill. BBC is liable for these damages together with any 
other damages that may be proved in an amount to be determined at trial. 
VI. Summary 
After due consideration of the memorandum and the arguments of counsel the court 
finds that Wasatch is a successor-in-interest to Mission with respect to the BLM properties and 
may redeem them by paying to Reott the amount that Reott bid at the Sheriffs Sale. The court 
is persuaded that Wasatch is not a successor-in-interest to Mission as to the Section 32 
properties and therefore cannot redeem those properties because (1) Wasatch does not have legal 
title based on three assignment forms signed by Justin Sutton in his individual capacity, and (2) 
Wasatch does not have equitable title by reason of fraudulent conveyance. Title to the Section 32 
properties sold at the sheriffs should therefore be quieted in the Reott Parties. 
BBC is liable to the Reott parties for any minerals converted on Reott's Section 32 Leases 
since February 9,2002, in an amount to be determined at trial. BBC is also liable in damages for 
resulting from forcibly removing disconnecting the Lavinia Pipeline. 
Defendants' counsel is directed to draft and submit to the court proposed Findings of Fact 
and a Partial Summary Judgment which are not inconsistent with this ruling. 
DATED this / ? _ J d a y of December, 2005. 
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INC., a Pennsylvania corporation, 
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Crossclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASATCH OIL & GAS, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, MISSION L.L.C., a 
Colorado limited liability company, 
WASATCH OIL & GAS PRODUCTION 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
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limited liability company, BILL BARRETT 
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The defendants Edward A. Reott, Goal, LLC, and Regoal, Inc. (collectively, the "Reott 
Parties"), through counsel and at the direction of the Court, submit the proposed Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts, supporting this Court's December 16, 2005 Ruling and its Order 
granting Partial Summary Judgment on Wasatch Wasatch's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 
Redemption, and, the Reott Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on Quiet Title, Fraudulent 
Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass to Chattels, 
On April 15, 2004, Plaintiff Wasatch Oil and Gas, LLC ("Wasatch") filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. On April 30, 2004, the Reott Parties filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition in addition to its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title, 
Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass to Chattels. Wasatch, Bill Barrett 
Corporation ("BBC") and the Reott Parties each filed opposing and reply memoranda. After full 
consideration of the briefs submitted by all parties, consideration of supplemental submissions, 
oral arguments held on January 24, 2005 and March 18, 2005, and post-hearing briefing 
submitted by all parties, the Court entered its Conclusions of Law on December 16, 2005. 
Pursuant to Rules 52(a), 56(c), and 56(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court states 
as follows: 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
This court reviewed all of the material information contained in the record and 
submitted by Wasatch, BBC and the Reott Parties in conjunction with Wasatch's and the Reott 
Parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. For purposes of summary judgment, Wasatch 
specifically identified ten of the facts presented by the Reott Parties in their supporting 
memorandum to which there was a material dispute: 1, 30, 30b, 30c, 44, 55, 56, 72, 73, and 82.1 
1
 See Wasatch's Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Reott's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Re: Quiet Title, Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass to Chattel, 
at viii - ix and n.l, x - xi, The Wasatch parties asserted generally that some of the Reott Parties' facts "are mainly 
contentions regarding the legal meaning of the underlying documents—which of course, are not [facts] at all, but 
legal argument," (see id. at iii), Wasatch, however, contrary to the requirements in Rule 7(c)(3)(B), did not identify 
Q«1£f\ 1 
With regard to the remaining facts, Wasatch took the position that there either was not a dispute 
or that the dispute was not material.2 With regard to the issues relating to title and fraudulent 
conveyance, BBC joined and adopted the facts and arguments presented in Wasatch's briefs, and 
disputed just one of those facts - number 49.3 With regard to the claims for trespass, conversion 
and trespass to chattels, BBC identified only eight facts as presented by the Reott Parties to 
which BBC claimed there was a "dispute." Those facts, as presented in the briefs, are numbered 
83, 84, 85, 87, 90, 93, 96 and 97.4 With regard to Wasatch's Statement of Undisputed Facts, 
Reott stated that it disputed or partially disputed fifteen of Wasatch's facts: 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 
20,22,23,24,26,27, 31, 39, and 57.5 
This Court reviewed all the undisputed facts proposed by the parties and considered 
all objections to and identified disputes with those facts. The Court finds that the following 
material facts are not in dispute: 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
REGARDING TITLE AND FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
1. The following entities are referred to collectively herein as "Wasatch": 
i. Third-party defendant Wasatch Oil & Gas Production Corporation 
("WOGC"), a Utah corporation; 
which of the specific facts it disputed as "legal argument." As such, facts not disputed are deemed admitted. 
2
 See id. at vii-viii, ix - x. 
3
 See Bill Barrett Corporation's Memorandum in Opposition to Reott Parties' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
re: Quiet Title, Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion and Trespass to Chattel, at 5. 
4
 See id at 6-7. 
5
 See Reott Parties' Memorandum in Opposition to Wasatch's Motion for Summary Judgment re: Redemption and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title, 
Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion, and Trespass to Chattels Against Wasatch and BBC, at iv - xvi. 
ii. Plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Wasatch Oil & Gas, L.L.C. 
("Wasatch LLC"), a Utah limited liability company; and 
iii. Third-party defendant Wasatch Gas Gathering, LLC ("Wasatch 
Gas"), a Utah limited liability company. 
2. The following persons or entities are referred to collectively herein as the 
"Reott Parties:" 
i. Defendant and counterclaim/third-party plaintiff Edward A. Reott 
("Reott"), an individual residing in Carbon County, Utah; 
ii. Third-party claimant Goal, LLC ("Goal"), a Utah limited liability; 
and 
iii. Third-party claimant Regoal, Inc. ("Regoal"), a Pennsylvania 
corporation authorized and doing business in the State of Utah. 
3. Third-party defendant Bill Barrett Corporation ("BBC") is a Maryland 
corporation with its principal place of business in Denver, Colorado, authorized to do, and doing 
business in, the State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Key Energy Services, Inc. ("Key Energy") is a Maryland 
corporation authorized and doing business in the State of Utah as Key Energy Services, Inc. 
Four Corners Division, 
5. Defendant J-West Oilfield Services, Inc. ("J West") is a Utah corporation. 
Mission Energy 
6. From approximately 1997 to 2000, Mission Energy LLC ("Mission") was a 
Colorado LLC engaged in the oil and gas business on federal and state land in Carbon and 
Duchesne Counties, {See Wasatch Fact No. 1: Undisputed) 
7. During that time, Justin C. Sutton ("Sutton") was a manager of Mission. {See 
Wasatch Fact No. 2: Undisputed.) 
Mission Owned Federal BLMLeases - Sections 27, 33 and 34 
8. As of May 31, 1999, Mission was the record title owner in three Bureau of 
Land Management ("BLM") Mineral Leases Nos. U-08107, No. SL-069551 and No. SL-071595. 
{See Wasatch Fact No. 3: Undisputed) 
9. Lease No. U-08107 covered the south half of Section 27, Township 12 South, 
Range 16 East, SLB&M ("Section 27"). (See Wasatch Fact No. 4: Undisputed.) 
10. Lease No. SL-069551 covered certain depths in Section 33, Township 12 
South, Range 16 East, SLB&M ("Section 33"). {See Wasatch Fact No. 5: Undisputed.) 
11. Lease No. SL-071595 covered depths below 3,460 feet in the south half of 
Section 34, Township 12 South, Range 16 East, SLB&M ("Section 34"). {See Wasatch Fact No. 
6: Undisputed.) 
Mission Owned State STTLA Leases - Section 32 
12. As of April 16, 1997, Mission was the record title owner of two mineral 
leasehold interests, issued by the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
("SITLA"), in Section 32—ML 43541 (560 acres) and ML 43798 (80 acres) ("Section 32 
Leases")—as reflected in the Carbon County Recorder's abstract of the chain of title for Section 
32. {See Reott Fact No, 2: Undisputed; Wasatch Fact No. 7: Undisputed.) 
13. ML 43541 (560 acres) and ML 43798 (80 acres) collectively covered the 
entire 640 acres of Section 32, Township 12 South, Range 16 Eastv SLB&M ("Section 32"). 
(See Wasatch Fact No. 8 and Reott Fact No. 2: Undisputed.) 
14. Mission Energy drilled the Lavinia State #1-32 well within the NW lA of the 
SE lA of Section 32 (the "Lavinia Well"). (See Wasatch Fact No. 9: Undisputed.) 
15. Mission operated the Lavinia Well pursuant to ML 43541. (See Wasatch Fact 
No. 10: Undisputed.) 
16. In 1997, Mission owned the following property in Section 32: (1) two mineral 
leases, identified as ML43798 (80 acres) and ML43541 (560 acres), which covered Section 32's 
entire 640 acres, with rights from the surface to the center of the earth; and (2) the Lavinia Well, 
and all equipment, pipelines, improvements, production, and all other personal property. (See 
Reott Fact No. 3: Undisputed.) 
Reott Obtains a Judgment Against Mission 
17. On or about February 24, 1997, at the request of Mission, the Estate of 
Lavinia Reott, Ed Reott's mother, made a bridge loan of $160,000 to Mission, which loan was 
promised to be repaid in three months. (See Reott Fact No. 4: Undisputed.) 
18. Mission did not repay the loan. (See Reott Fact No. 5: Undisputed.) 
19. On May 15, 1998, Reott filed a lawsuit against Mission in Pennsylvania 
federal district court to recover the unpaid bridge loan. The case was removed to Colorado 
federal district court in August 1998, and after trial on December 20, 1999, Reott obtained a 
judgment against Mission in the amount of $204,000, plus costs and post-judgment interest of 
5.67%. {See Reott Fact No. 6: Undisputed.) 
Various Other Creditors Assert Claims Against Mission 
20. From February 1998 through May 2000, eleven mechanics liens were 
recorded against Mission's interest in Section 32 because Mission had failed to pay for goods 
and services provided. {See Reott Fact No. 7: Undisputed.) 
21. Key Energy Services, Inc. recorded its mechanics lien against Mission's 
interest in Section 32, on February 24, 1999 in the Carbon County Recorders office, identifying 
July 16, 1998 as the date of first work, and August 29, 1998 as the date of last work. {See Reott 
Fact No. 8: Undisputed.) 
22. J-West Oilfield Service, Inc. recorded its Notice of Lien against Mission's 
interest in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34, on August 12, 1999 in the Carbon County Recorders 
office, identifying January 1, 1998, as the date of first work and May 22, 1999, as the date of last 
work {See Reott Fact No. 9; Wasatch Fact No. 18: Undisputed.) 
Transfer of Mission's BLM Leases to WOGC 
23. On June 1, 1999 and December 20, 1999, Mission executed "Transfer[s] of 
Operating Rights (Sublease) in a Lease for Oil and Gas or Geothermal Resources," in favor of 
Wasatch Oil & Gas, Corp. ("WOGC"), to convey its interests in Sections 27, 33 and 34 (among 
other interests), including Mineral Lease U-08107, No. SL-069551 and No. SL-071595. {See 
Wasatch Fact No. 11,12). 
24. The BLM approved the June 1, 1999 transfer on September 1, 1999, and it 
approved the December 20, 1999 transfer on March 1, 2000. (See Wasatch Fact No. 14: 
Undisputed.) 
Key Energy and J-Westfile foreclosure actions and record Lis Pendens against Mission Energy 
25. On August 13, 1999, Key Energy recorded a Lis Pendens in the Carbon 
County Recorder's office, giving notice that Key Energy had filed a lawsuit against Mission to 
foreclose its mechanics lien against Mission (See Reott Fact No. 10: Undisputed.) 
26. On January 6, 2000, J-West filed a Lis Pendens in the Carbon County 
Recorder's office, giving notice that J-West had filed a lawsuit against Mission to foreclose its 
mechanics lien against Mission. (See Reott Fact No. 11: Undisputed.) 
J-West obtains Judgment and Order of Foreclosure Against Mission 
27. On May 22, 2000, J-West obtained a Default Judgment and Order of 
Foreclosure against Mission, in the amount of $14,825.26, plus "after accruing legal fees and 
costs." {See Reott Fact No. 12; Wasatch Fact No. 18: Undisputed,) 
Sutton Attempts to transfer Section 32 Leases: June 2L ^ 2000 Letter Agreement 
28. On June 21, 2000, Mission and WOGC executed a letter agreement (the 
"Letter Agreement") providing, among other things, for the transfer of Mission's mineral lease 
rights in Section 32 (ML 43541 and ML 43798), in addition to Mission's interests in other leases, 
to WOGC. (See Reott Fact No. 66: Undisputed.) 
29. The following Leases were the subject of the June 21,2000 Letter Agreement: 
The ten leases are identified as: UT65486, UT69463, UT60470, UT62890, UT66801, UT62645, 
UT65782, UT65783, ML 43541, ML43798. Collectively, these leases are referred to hereafter 
as the "Jack Canyon Leases." {See Reott FactNo. 66a: Undisputed.) 
30. The Letter also states that "Mission will assign the [Jack Canyon Unit] 
operations to Wasatch," and that "Mission will work in good faith to transfer to Wasatch any 
pending APDs on the Leases," and that Mission will indemnify Wasatch. {See Reott Fact No. 
67: Undisputed.) 
31. The Letter Agreement stated that Mission will "assign to Wasatch all record 
title and working interest to all the Leases except for the well bore rights and attributable spacing 
unit relating to the [Lavinia Well]," in exchange for "a right to participate in a 'trade' relating to 
a drilling deal that Wasatch may be successful in putting together on the Leases." In addition, 
Wasatch assumed the obligation to maintain the leases it received and agreed to reimburse 
Mission for $3,629.00 in rental payments that Mission had made on four of the leases. {See 
Reott Fact No. 68: Undisputed; Wasatch Reply at x, xil)) 
32. Under the Letter Agreement, Mission would retain~the Lavinia Well, and the 
mineral lease rights to the forty-acre section of Section 32 where the Lavinia 1-32 Well sits 
(NW1/4, SE1/4), from the surface down to the depth of 3,398 feet. (See Wasatch Fact No. 20: 
Undisputed). 
Sutton executes three Mineral Lease Assignment Forms for Section 321 
33. On June 23, 2000, Sutton executed three "Mineral Lease Assignment Forms" 
purporting to transfer to WOGC all of the "lessee / assignor's" interest in Section 32, specifically 
the ML 43541 and ML 43798 leases, with the exception of the Lavinia Well and the forty-acre 
section of the ML 43541 lease (located NW1/4, SE1/4), from the surface to a depth of 3,398 feet 
(See Wasatch Fact No. 21: Undisputed.) 
34. The three Mineral Lease Assignment Forms related to the ML43541 and 
ML43798 leases ("Mineral Lease Assignments"), are signed by Justin C. Sutton, and state that 
the "assignor's / lessee's11 rights to the leases are assigned to WOGC. (See Reott Fact No. 30: 
Undisputed; See Mineral Lease Assignments, attached at Appendix to Reott Parties' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Exhibits 16, 17, 18.) 
35. The Mineral Lease Assignments identify Justin C. Sutton as the 
"assignor/lessee." Mission's name does not appear in the body of the assignment. (See Reott 
Fact No. 30b: Undisputed; See Mineral Lease Assignments, attached at Appendix to Reott 
Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits 16, 17, 18.) 
36. Sutton did not, and has never held, any personal interest in the Section 32 
Leases. (Undisputed; See Wasatch/BBC Objection.) 
37. Sutton is not identified on the Mineral Lease Assignments as the manager of 
Mission or as a person authorized to execute the assignments on behalf of Mission. (See Mineral 
Lease Assignments, attached at Appendix to Reott Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibits 16, 17, 18.) 
38. In addition, the Mineral Lease Assignment Forms are improperly notarized, 
reflecting that Heather Holdorf—and not Justin C. Sutton—executed the documents. (See Reott 
Fact No. 3Od: Undisputed.) 
39. On the backside of the Mineral Lease Assignments, WOGC hand writes that it 
accepts the transfer of the Section 32 Leases from Mission. (See Mineral Lease Assignments, 
attachedat Appendix to Reott Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits 16, 17, 18.) 
40. The Mineral Lease Assignment Forms (nor any other conveyance document) 
for the Section 32 Leases were not recorded with the Carbon County Recorder. (See Reott Fact 
No. 31: Undisputed.) 
The ML43541 Lease, in Section 32, is carved up to excise the Lavinia Well 
41. The Mineral Lease Assignment Forms carve up the ML 43541 lease, and 
appear to convey to WOGC, all of the leasehold interests in Section 32, with the exception of a 
carved out 40-acre section of the ML 43541 lease, upon which the Lavinia 1-32 well is located, 
with rights limited to a depth of 3,398 feet, which was retained by Mission. (See Reott Fact No. 
32: Undisputed.) 
42. Todd Cusick, WOGC's President, testified during WOGC's 30(b)(6) 
deposition as follows: 
Q. • Tell me each reason why the Lavinia Well was carved out 
of the June letter, June 2000 Letter agreement. 
A. Somewhere along there, as I told you before, I don't know 
exactly where to place it, but by virtue of our business with J-West 
and Key Energy, you know, it became apparent that there were 
some monies owed there and we didn't want anything to do with 
that. And so that part was just carved out so that we could stay 
away from issues between Mission and J-West and Key Energy, or 
filleted out. 
(See Reott Fact No. 34: Undisputed.) 
43. WOGC knew about Mission's debts to Key Energy and J-West. (See Reott 
Fact No. 35: Undisputed) 
44. The Key Energy and J-West mechanics liens and lis pendens were recorded in 
the Carbon County Recorder's office, against Mission's interest in Section 32, prior to the 
June 21, 2000 attempt to transfer the Section 32 Leases to WOGC. (See Reott Fact No. 36: 
Undisputed.) 
45. The J-West Judgment had been entered on May 22, 2000, by this Court, and 
automatically became a lien against all of Mission's real property owned as of May 22, 2000, 
including all of its interest in Section 32, before WOGC acquired any interest through the June 
23,2000 Mineral Lease Assignment Forms. (See Reott Fact No. 37: Undisputed.) 
46. WOGC decided, on its own, that the Key Energy mechanics lien, the J-West 
mechanics lien and the J-West judgment only attached to the Lavinia Well. (See Reott Fact No. 
38: Undisputed.) 
47. WOGC and Mission decided to "carve or fillet out that well and the 40 acres 
that goes with it and move it aside." (See Reott Fact No. 39: Undisputed.) 
48. WOGC was not interested in the Lavinia well, and believed that it was "more 
of a liability than it was of any value." (See Reott Fact No. 40: Undisputed.) 
After June 23, 2000, Mission Retains Only the Lavinia 1-32 Well 
49. After June 23, 2000, Mission retained only the Lavinia 1-32 well, and a 
limited 40-acre section of the ML 43541 lease, with rights limited to a depth of 3398 feet. (See 
Reott Fact No. 41: Undisputed.) 
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50. WOGC knew that, if the June 2000 transaction was completed, Mission was 
without any assets, with the exception of the Lavinia Well. {See Reott Fact No. 75: 
Undisputed.) 
WOGC and Wasatch Do Not Obtain Drilling Deal as promised for the June 2000 Transfers 
51. WOGC/Wasatch did not put together a drilling deal (See Reott Fact No. 70: 
Undisputed) 
52. WOGC/Wasatch testified that it had no obligation to obtain a drilling deal. 
(See Reott Fact No. 71: Undisputed.) 
53. Mr. Cusick, as the 30(b)(6) deponent for WOGC/Wasatch, testified: 
Q: . . . What did you do to determine the value of the property 
you received from Mission with respect to the June 2000 letter 
agreement? 
A: . . . [W]e negotiated what we thought the value was and the 
value came out to be—or what they wanted was what we call a 
back-in, meaning that if we were able to go out there and get 
somebody to take those leases and drill wells on those leases and 
carry us for our percentage of that drilling arrangement, that 
Mission could back into a specific percentage of what we were 
given I asked them what they wanted and what he wanted was 
the chance to participate in a drilling arrangement. That's what 
they were trying to accomplish, and that's what we gave them. 
Q: And do you know what value you placed on the property, 
just the contract value that's mentioned in the . . . June 11th letter? 
A: The trade there is their right to participate in a drilling deal 
that was cut We did not place a dollar value on the acreage in 
that. We simply traded the operating rights in those agreements for 
giving them a piece of a drilling deal that we were able to obtain, 
and that's what they wanted. They wanted to do it that way. They 
didn't—we—and so that's what we gave them. 
Q 
A 
And were you ever able to obtain a drilling deal? 
No. Well, rather than doing a drilling deal we sold it all... 
So did you give Mission any consideration back for its 
interest in your prospective drilling deal? 
A 
Q 
Why would we do that? 
They got nothing for that part of the contract? 
They got the right to participate in a drilling deal that never 
happened.... 
Q: And you didn't provide Mission any consideration for that 
failure as a result of the Bill Barrett transaction? 
A: The deal is- self-explanatory. You can see there was no 
consideration for that event if we were to sell it all What they 
wanted was the right to participate in a drilling deal if it happened, 
and it didn't happen and so that's what they got. They got what 
they asked for. 
(See Todd Cusick Depo cited in Reott Facts No. 70 and 71: Undisputed.) 
WOGC Requests ML 43541 be Partitioned to ML 43541 and ML43541-A 
54, On or about September 15,2000, SITLA granted WOGC's request to partition 
the ML 43541 lease into two sections; a 520 acre section and a forty-acre section. The 520 acre 
section is now identified as ML43541-A. (See Reott Fact No. 42: Undisputed.) 
55* The forty-acre section upon which the Lavinia Well is located remains 
identified as the ML 43541 lease, (See Reott Fact No. 43: Undisputed.) 
56. After September 21, 2000, Section 32 now contains mineral leases, currently 
identified as ML43798 (80 acres, w/rights from surface to center of the earth), ML43541-A (520 
acres, w/rights from surface to center of the earth), and ML43541 (40 acres, w/rights from 
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surface to center of the earth); and (2) the Lavinia Well, and all equipment, pipelines, 
improvements, production, and all other personal property located on the same 40 acre section as 
lease ML4354L (See Reott Fact No. 43: Undisputed) 
Reott Domesticates the Colorado Judgment Against Mission in Carbon County 
57. On October 27, 2000, defendant Edward A, Reott domesticated in this Court, 
the Colorado Judgment against Mission. ("Reott Domesticated Judgment"). (See Reott Fact No. 
13: Undisputed.) 
WOGC transfers the Section 32 Leases to Wasatch: Wasatch records a wild deed 
58. The Carbon County Recorder's office shows that on November 27, 2000, a 
Bill of Sale and Assignment between WOGC and Wasatch LLC is recorded. (See Reott Fact No. 
14: Undisputed.) 
59. The Bill of Sale and Assignment, and the related WOGC Asset Purchase 
Agreement, purports to transfer WOGC's interest in the Section 32 Leases to Wasatch. The 
documents were executed on October 27, 2000, but they state that they are effective as of July 1, 
2000 -just nine days after Sutton executed the Mineral Lease Assignment Forms related to the 
Section 32 Leases. (See Reott Fact No. 15: Undisputed.) 
60. As of November 27, 2000, the Carbon County Recorder's abstract of Section 
32 does not show any transfer of Mission's property interest in Section 32 to WOGC, and it does 
not show any transfer of such interests to WOGC- (See Reott Fact No. 16: Undisputed.) 
Key Energy obtains Judgment and Order of Foreclosure Against Mission 
61. On December 13, 2000, Key Energy obtained an Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Decree Foreclosing Oil & Gas Lien, entering judgment against Mission 
in the amount of $33,159.82, plus interest at a rate of 24%, plus post-judgment attorney fees and 
costs. (SeeReott Fact No. 18; Wasatch Fact No. 19: Undisputed.) 
J-West and Key Energy Assign Interest in Judgments and Liens to Reott 
62. On January 19, 2001, J-West assigned its interest in its judgment and lien to 
Reott. Reott paid J-West $15,000 for the assignment. (See Reott Fact No. 19: Undisputed^) 
- 63. Reott recorded the assignment from J-West on January 29, 2001, in the 
Carbon County Recorder's office. (See Reott Fact No. 20; Wasatch Fact No. 29: Undisputed.) 
64. On April 27, 2001, Key Energy assigned its interest in its judgment and lien 
against Mission to Reott. Reott paid Key Energy $14,000 for the assignment. (See Reott Fact 
No. 21; Wasatch Fact No. 30: Undisputed.) 
65. Reott recorded the assignment from Key Energy on May 4, 2001, in the 
Carbon County Recorder's office. (See Reott Fact No. 22: Undisputed.) 
The August 9. 2001 Sheriffs Sale 
66. On May 16,2001, Reott through his former counsel filed with this Court three 
separate pleadings styled "Motion for Writs of Execution" seeking enforcement of (1) the Key 
Energy Default Judgment, (2) the J-West Default Judgment, and (3) the Reott Colorado 
Judgment against Mission's interest in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34, and served the Sheriff of 
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Carbon County with a Praecipe for each of these judgment interests. (See Wasatch Fact No. 32; 
Reott Fact No. 23 and 24: Undisputed.) 
67. The Sheriffs sale was held on August 9, 2001. (See Reott Fact No. 25; 
Wasatch Fact No. 33: Undisputed.) 
68. No other bidders appeared, so Reott credit bid $1.00, and received a Sheriffs 
Certificate of Sale for all of Mission's interests in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. (See Reott Fact 
No. 26; Wasatch Fact No. 34: Undisputed.) 
69. Deputy Craig thereafter issued a Sheriff s Certificate of Sale verifying that he 
had sold to Reott for the sum of $1.00, as the "highest bid made," the following property: (See 
Wasatch Fact No. 35: Undisputed.) 
Township 12 South Range 16 East; Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 in 
Carbon County Utah together with oil and gas lease (Utah State 
Mineral Lease No.. ML-43541), the oil and gas well located 
thereon referred to as Lavinia Slate L# 1-32 [sic], and all 
productions, improvements, equipments and pipelines on or 
appurtenant to the well. 
70. The Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was recorded on August 9, 2001, reflecting a 
transfer of Mission's interest in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34 to Edward A. Reott. (See Reott Fact 
No. 27: Undisputed.) 
Wasatch Files Notice of Redemption & Quiet Title Action 
71. On December 24, 2001, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC, filed a Notice of Exercise 
of Right of Redemption ("Redemption Notice"). That same day, Wasatch filed a complaint to 
quiet title ("Quiet Title Action"). (See Reott Fact No. 28; Wasatch Fact No. 36: Undisputed.) 
72. The Wasatch Redemption Notice consisted of eleven pages and eighteen 
exhibits. {See Wasatch Fact No. 37: Undisputed.) 
73. Attached to Wasatch's Redemption Notice are the three Mineral Lease 
Assignment Forms related to the Section 32 Leases, ML43541 and ML43798 ("Mineral Lease 
Assignments"), signed by Justin C. Sutton. (See ReottFactNo. 30: Undisputed.) 
74. The Wasatch Redemption Notice provides: 
(C) Unredeemed Interests. 
Wasatch does not redeem and asserts no right or 
redemption, and disclaims any right, title or interest in or to that 
portion of the Sale Properties described as follows: 
(a) A portion of Utah State Mineral Lease No. ML-
43541, covering the Green-Mesa Strata of the NWV4 of the SEVi of 
Section 32, Township 12 South, Range 16 East, SLB&M, Carbon 
County, Utah (i.e., the site of the Lavinia 1-32 Well); 
(b) The improvements, equipment, pipelines, wells and other 
personal property situated on or appurtenant to the Lavinia 1-32 
Well or located on the NWVi of the SEVi of said Section 32 
(See Wasatch Fact No. 40 and Redemption Notice: Undisputed.) 
75. Wasatch does not redeem nor claim an interest in the Lavinia Well, the upper 
portion of the ML 43541 lease—which covers the 40-acres upon which the Lavinia Well sits, 
from the surface to a depth of 3,398 feet—or the equipment, improvements, pipelines, or 
production within the 40-acre section. (See ReottFactNo. 33: Undisputed.) 
76. The Wasatch Redemption Notice was served by certified mail on the Clerk of 
the Court, the County Recorder and the County Sheriff and was served by mail on then-counsel 
forReott. (See Wasatch Fact No. 38: Undisputed.) 
Sheriffs Office's Response to Wasatch's Notice of Redemption 
77. On January 10, 2002, Deputy Craig of the Carbon County Sheriffs office sent 
a letter to Wasatch (a) certifying receipt of the Wasatch Redemption Notice on December 26, 
2001, and (b) stating that, "after due and diligent search and inquiry L am unable to find 
MISSION ENERGY within Carbon County, State of Utah. EDWARD A. REOTT, KEY 
ENERGY SERVICES AND J-WEST OlLFIELD SERVICES ARE NOT LOCATED IN 
CARBON COUNTY, UTAH." (See Wasatch Fact No. 49: Undisputed) 
78. The Carbon County Sheriffs office returned to Wasatch check #686507335 
for $1.06. (See Wasatch Fact No. 51: Undisputed.). 
Wasatch's Second Redemption Notice 
79. On January 18, 2002, filed a second Notice of Redemption and Tender of 
Redemption Amount in the Key Energy case, the J-West case, and the Reott Judgment case (the 
"Second Wasatch Redemption Notice")- (See Wasatch Fact No. 52: Undisputed.) 
80. The Second Wasatch Redemption Notice was served on the same persons who 
were served with the First Redemption Notice: the Clerk of this Court, the County Recorder, the 
County Sheriffs Office and then-counsel for Reott. (See Wasatch Fact No. 53: Undisputed.) 
81. At the same time, on January 18, 2002, Wasatch filed with this Court a 
"Notice of Filing Notice of Redemption and Tender of Redemption Amount" (the "Wasatch 
Notice of Filing") in order to give further, formal notice that it had filed the Second Wasatch 
Redemption Notice. (See Wasatch Fact No. 54: Undisputed.) 
Reott Obtains Sheriffs Deed and Transfers Interests to Rezoal 
82. On or about February 9, 2002, Reott obtains a Sheriffs Deed to the property. 
That same day, Reott transferred whatever rights he acquired at the Sheriffs Sale, as evidenced 
by the Certificate of Sale, to Regoal, Inc. ("Regoal"), a company he controls. (See Reott Fact 
47; Wasatch Fact No. 56: Undisputed,) 
83. The Carbon County Sheriffs Office did not issue a redemption certificate to 
Wasatch. (See Reott Fact 46: Undisputed) 
84. On March 11, 2002, the Reott Parties recorded the Sheriffs Deed in the 
Carbon County Recorder's Office. (See Reott Fact No. 47: Undisputed.) 
85. The Carbon County Abstract for Section 32 shows no recorded conveyance 
from Mission to anyone, not to mention WOGC, until February 9, 2001, when the Reott Parties 
acquired the Sheriffs Deed. (See Reott Fact No. 51: Undisputed.) 
Reott's Objection to Redemption 
86. The tender was rejected by Reott. (Undisputed; See Wasatch/BBC Objection.) 
87. In response to Wasatch's Notice of Redemption, the Reott Parties filed a 
"Notice that Wasatch is Not a Proper Party to Redeem or That the Amount of Redemption Is 
Insufficient." (See Reott Fact No. 29: Undisputed.) 
Reott files and records Motion to Prohibit Transfer of Property 
88. In response to Wasatch's Redemption Notice, Reott filed a Motion to Prohibit 
the Transfer of Property. (See Motion to Prohibit Transfer of Property Pursuant to Rule 69(Q) 
and 69(S), Case Nos. 000700003, 006700886, 990700565.) And, on February 8, 2002, Reott 
recorded with the Carbon County Recorder's office, a "Notice of Motion Pending Pursuant to 
Rule 69(Q) and 69(S), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (See Reott Fact No. 45: Undisputed) 
Reott records Lis Pendens, giving notice of the vending lawsuit 
89. On April 18, 2002, Reott filed a lis pendens in the Carbon County Recorder's 
office, giving notice of Reott's current quiet title action in Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. (See Reott 
Fact No. 48: Undisputed.) 
Wasatch Sells Section 32, and Other Former Mission Property, to Bill Barrett Corporation 
90. On May 17, 2002, Bill Barrett Corporation ("BBC") recorded an Assignment 
and Bill of Sale, reflecting that Wasatch sold to BBC all of the property it had acquired from 
Mission, including the Section 32 Leases. The Bill of Sale was executed on or about April 15, 
2002, and noted an "effective date" of April 1, 2002. (See Reott Fact No. 49: Undisputed by 
Wasatch; BBC dispute taken into account.) 
91. As reflected in the plain language of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, BBC 
and Wasatch had knowledge—prior to the sale to BBC—of the J-West mechanics lien and 
judgment, the Key Energy mechanics lien and judgment, and the Reott Domesticated Judgment, 
and BBC knew about the pending quiet title action filed by Wasatch, and the claims and defenses 
asserted by the Reott Parties. (See Reott Fact No. 50: Undisputed.) 
92. Through a Purchase and Sale Agreement dated April 30, 2002, BBC acquired 
all of Wasatch's right, title and interest in and to Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. (Undisputed; See 
Wasatch/BBC Objection.) 
93. As Wasatch's successor, BBC acquired only whatever rights Wasatch had in 
Sections 27, 32, 33 and 34. (Undisputed; See Wasatch/BBC Objection.) 
Additional Findings of Material Undisputed Facts Concerning Fraudulent Transfer 
94. Mission's accountant Bruce Hill testified that Mission was undercapitalized, 
that its financial condition was marginal in 1998, that it did not have the money to pay the Reott 
Colorado Judgment obtained in December 1999, and that he would have advised Mission's 
creditors not to bother attempting to collect debts in December 1999. {See Reott Fact No. 59: 
Undisputed.) 
95. At the time the Reott Bridge Loan was made, in February 1997, Mission had 
no ability to repay the loan within the time promised. (See Reott Fact No. 60: Undisputed.) 
96. Mission was not paying its debts as they came due, as evidenced by 
a. the Key Energy Lien (2/1999), Lis Pendens (8/1999), and Judgment 
(12/2000), 
b. the J-West Lien (8/1999), Lis Pendens (1/2000) and Default Judgment 
(5/2000), 
c. the Reott Colorado Judgment (12/1999), domesticated in Carbon County 
on 10/26/2000), and 
d. the nine other mechanics liens recorded in the Carbon County Recorder's 
office, against Mission's interest in Section 32, Township 12S, Range 16E, in Carbon County 
from February 20,1998 to April 20,2000. (See Reott Fact No. 61: Undisputed.) 
97. Mission's June 1999 and December 1999 accounts payable ledger reflects that 
Mission was not paying its debts as they came due, and that several debts were more than one 
year past due. (See Reott Fact No. 62: Undisputed) 
98. Mission's balance sheets show that its liabilities exceeded its assets. (See 
ReottFactNo. 63: Undisputed.) 
99. Effective June 1, 1999 (executed June 30, 1999, recorded July 17, 1999), 
Mission conveyed to Wasatch all of its interests in 18 leases and 11 wells, located in Carbon and 
Duchesne Counties, including all of its interest in several leases and a pipeline located on 
Sections 27, 33 and 34 in Carbon County. (See ReottFactNo, 64: Undisputed.) 
100. On May 1, 2000, by letter, Mission agreed to transfer to Wasatch Oil & Gas 
Corporation all of its interest in approximately 16 leases ("May 2000 Letter"). (See Reott Fact 
No. 65: Undisputed.) 
101. On June 21, 2000, Mission, by letter, states that "Mission will assign to 
Wasatch all record title and working interest to all the Leases except for the wellbore rights and 
attributable spacing unit relating to the Lavinia #1-32 well." ("June 2000 Letter Agreement") 
The "Leases" include Mission's interest in ten leases, including the leases covering Section 32— 
ML43541, ML43798, and any pending APDs on the Leases. (See Reott Fact No. 66, 67: 
Undisputed.) 
102. The June 2000 Letter was never recorded. (See Reott Fact No. 69: 
Undisputed.) 
103. The Mineral Lease Assignment forms for the Section 32 Leases—ML4S541 
and ML43798—were not recorded with the Carbon County Recorder's Office at the time of the 
alleged transfer, were not recorded at the time of the Sheriffs sale, were not recorded at the time 
Wasatch filed its Redemption Notice, and were not recorded when Wasatch sold its interests to 
BBC. In fact, the Mineral Lease Assignments were not recorded until March 17, 2003. (See 
Reott FactNo. 76: Undisputed.) 
104. On August 22,2000, Mission sent a letter to Todd Cusick of WOGC stating: 
There are several creditors with outstanding issues.,.. specifically 
Ed Reott . . . I must advise your offices to refer any similar 
creditor, or legal calls directly to my attention. Further given the 
confidentiality of the agreements entered into between our 
companies, I would request that no verbal, or written information 
be sent to anyone without prior written permission from Mission 
Energy. 
(See Reott Fact No. 77: Undisputed.) 
105. That same day, August 22, 2000, Justin C. Sutton of Mission wrote to Ed 
Reott, representing, among other things: 
. . . the managers of Mission Energy are doing everything possible 
to protect the assets of the company. We are working with several 
companies to develop a drilling program in hopes of receiving 
revenues to pay off creditors of the company. In that regard, many 
of those creditors who are owed monies for operations and 
permitting that have not been paid are working with Mission to try 
and make the company successful. 
(See Reott Fact No. 78: Undisputed.) 
106. On December 26, 2000, Justin C. Sutton, on behalf of Mission, sent a letter to 
J-West's counsel Clark Allred, stating that Mission will satisfy the judgment, and requesting that 
J-West recognize Mission's rights. The letter contains no mention that Mission had transferred 
assets—not to mention its interests in Section 32, 33, 34 and the S/2 of 27, to WOGC. {See 
Reott Fact No. 79: Undisputed) 
107. By letter dated October 23, 2000, Justin C. Sutton represented to Mr. Reott's 
attorney, federal judges, magistrates and court clerks, that effective October 1, 2000, Justin C. 
Sutton had resigned as Manager of Mission, and that future correspondence should be sent to 
"legal counsel at 531 Encinitas Blvd. #200, Encinitas, California, 92024/' {See Reott Fact No. 
80: Undisputed.) 
108. The address Sutton provided was not the address of "legal counsel," as 
represented, but the California address for Intermarket Trading. {See Reott Fact No. 81: 
Undisputed.) 
109. Mission was organized as a Colorado limited liability company. {See Wasatch 
Fact No. 1: Undisputed.) 
110. Mission's Operating Agreement identifies four initial managers—Fred G. 
Jager, Mr. Sutton, William F. Muller, and Charles B. Willard. {See Reott Fact No. 56, and 
Wasatch's Response to Fact No. 56; See Reott Reply Brief at vi and Operating Agreement in 
Reott Appendix, Exhibit 8 - Undisputed.) 
111. The Operating Agreement expressly states that there must be four managers at 
all times, and that a majority (i.e., three) of these managers must agree to and approve of all 
major company decisions, including the disposition of corporate assets. {See Operating 
Agreement in Reott Appendix, Exhibit 8.) 
112. The Operating Agreement expressly requires the signature of two managers to 
dispose of company property. {See Reott Fact No. 57—undisputed; Operating Agreement in 
Reott Appendix, Exhibit 8) 
113. Mr. Sutton was the only signatory on the documentation surrounding the 
purported June 1999, May 2000 and June 2000 Transfers to WOGC. {Undisputed'- see Transfer 
Documents.) 
114. The documents Mission executed to transfer the BLM leases covering 
Sections 27, 33 and 34 and the SITLA leases covering Section 32 to WOGC reflect only one 
signature from a representative of Mission. {Undisputed - see transfer documents attached to 
Wasatch's Notice of Redemption; see Reott Appendix, Exhibits 16, 17, 18.) 
115. At the time of these three transfers, Mr. Sutton was the only manager of 
Mission. {See Wasatch Reply Memo at vi, x; see also Wasatch/BBC Objection at 8.) 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS REGARDING TRESPASS. 
TRESPASS TO CHATTELS AND CONVERSION 
BBC Drilled Two Wells on Section 32 and Has Reported Production since December 2003 
116. BBC has drilled two new wells on Section 32, on either side of the Lavinia 
Well. These wells are connected to the gathering system, and BBC began reporting production 
from those wells in December 2003, {See Reott Fact 98, 99 - undisputed; BBC hearing 
statement confirming production.) 
BBC Forcibly Removes the Lavinia Pipeline, Damages the Oil Tank Causes an Oil Spill and 
Refuses to Replace the Pipeline and to Pay Any Damages. 
117. On or about October 30, 2003, BBC's "pipe crew" inadvertently removed, 
with force, the pipeline ("Lavinia Pipeline") that provided the physical connection between the 
Lavinia Well and the gas gathering system. (See Reott Fact 83, as modified by BBC's identified 
dispute; See Reott Reply Brief at xiv.) 
118. The next day, on November 1, 2003, Mr. Reott observed the damage caused 
by BBC's pipe crew. Mr. Reott observed that, when the pipeline was ripped out, the meter house 
for the Lavinia Well ("Lavinia Meter house) was pulled off its foundation into a pine tree. The 
gas line running from the meter house to the well head ("Gas Production Line") had been bent on 
to the oil production line ("Oil Production Line"), and had ruptured at a 90 degree connection. 
(See Reott Fact 84; BBC Response No. 84- undisputed; See Reott Reply Brief at xv.) 
119. The Lavinia Well was shut down, the heater in the oil tank ("Oil Tank") was 
turned off, and the oil in the tank had turned solid. (See Reott Fact 85; BBC Response No. 85 -
undisputed; See Reott Reply Brief at xvl) 
120. BBC's Jeff Addley apologized to Reott for the damage caused by BBC's pipe 
crew, and stated that BBC would "fix it and take care of it." (See Reott Fact 86 - undisputed.) 
121. On or about November 15, 2003, BBC repaired the Lavinia Meter house and 
the ruptured Gas Production Line. (See Reott Fact 87, as modified by BBC Response to 87 - no 
dispute; See Reott Reply Brief at xvil) 
122. On November 15, 2003, BBC's senior landman, Mr. Tab McGinley visited 
the Lavinia Well site to confirm that BBC had repaired the Lavinia Meter house. He observed 
the Oil Tank shaking, due to the co-production of oil and gas into the same tank. {See BBC 
Response to Reott Fact 90 - no dispute; See Reott Reply Brief at xvii-xviii.) 
123. That same day, Reott turned the heater back on and began reheating the oil in 
the Oil Tank. {See Reott Fact 88 — undisputed) 
124. On or about December 1, 2003, the next time Reott returned to the Lavinia 
Well, after the Oil Tank was heated, approximately 90 barrels of oil leaked from the Oil Tank 
and had filled the protective berm surrounding the tank. This resulted in the Lavinia Well again 
being shut down. {See Reott Fact 89 ~ undisputed,) 
125. Reott—as the property owner—inspected the Oil Tank. Reott determined that 
the force used by BBC in removing the Lavinia Pipeline from the connection to the Lavinia 
Meter house bent the Gas Production Line approximately 18" into the Oil Production Line, 
damaging the connection to the Oil Tank. {See Reott Fact 90 and BBC's claimed dispute; See 
Reott Reply Brief at xvii-xviii.) 
126. Reott contacted Mr. Addley of BBC to report the spill and asked BBC to 
repair and cleanup the damage, {See Reott Fact 91-undisputed.) 
127- BBC has refused to replace or pay the cost to replace the Lavinia Pipeline. 
{See Reott Fact 97; BBC Response 97 —undisputed; See Reott Reply Brief at xx-xxi.) 
128. BBC refused to repair the damage to the Oil Tank, refused to clean up the oil 
spill, and refused to compensate the Reott Parties for lost oil production and the lost sale of 
approximately 100 barrels of oil. {See Reott Fact 97; BBC's Response 97 - undisputed; See 
Reott Reply Brief at xx-xxl) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Relying on the above statement of undisputed material facts, the Court made its 
December 16, 2005 Ruling on (1) Wasatch's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: 
Redemption Issues and (2) Reott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Quiet Title, 
Fraudulent Conveyance, Trespass, Conversion, and Trespass to Chattels. 
DATED this 7M day of IKMAA" 2006. 
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[. Harmond, Jr. J^esss Judge Gec^ge M 
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Rule 67 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDI/RE 778 
(h) Appointment of receiver on dissolution of corporation. 
Upon the dissolution of a corporation the district court of the 
county in which the corporation carries on its business, or has 
its principal place of business, on application of any creditor of 
the corporation, or of any stockholder or member thereof, may 
appoint one or more persons to be receivers of the corporation, 
to take charge of the estate and effects thereof, and to collect 
the debts and property due and belonging to the corporation, 
to pay the outstanding debts thereof and to divide the remain-
ing moneys and other property among the stockholders or 
members. 
(i) Dismissal of action. An action wherein a receiver has 
been appointed shall not be dismissed except by order of the 
court. 
Rule 67. Deposit in court. 
When it is admitted by the pleadings, or shown upon the 
examination of a party, that he has in his possession or under 
his control any money or other thing capable of delivery, 
which, being the subject of litigation, is held by him as trustee 
for another party, or which belongs or is due to another party, 
the court may order the same, upon motion, to be deposited in 
court or delivered to such party upon such conditions as may 
be just, subject to the further direction of the court; provided 
that if money is paid into court under this rule it shall be 
deposited and withdrawn in accordance with Section 78-27-4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, or any like statute. 
Rule 68. Offer of judgment. 
(a) Tender of money before suit. When in an action for the 
recovery of money only, the defendant alleges in his answer 
that before the commencement of the action he tendered to the 
plaintiff the full amount to which the plaintiff was entitled, 
and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff the amount so 
tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff 
cannot recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant. 
(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days before 
the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve 
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken 
against him for the money or property or to the effect specified 
in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the 
service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that 
the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer ^nd 
notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and 
thereupon judgment shall be entered. An offer not accepted 
shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not 
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the 
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable 
than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not 
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. 
Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto. 
(a) Availability of writ of execution. A writ of execution is 
available to a judgment creditor to satisfy a judgment or other 
order requiring the delivery of property or the payment of 
money by a judgment debtor. 
(b) Property subject to execution. A writ of execution may be 
used to levy upon all of the judgment debtor's personal 
property and real property which is not exempt from execution 
under state or federal law. 
' (c) Issuance of writ of execution. Unless otherwise ordered 
by the court, a writ of execution may be issued at any time 
within eight years following the entry of a judgment or order 
(except an execution may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62), 
either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or 
in any county in which a transcript thereof has been filed and 
docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Not-
withstanding the death of a party after judgment, execution 
thereon may be issued, or such judgment may be enforced, as 
follows: 
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the 
application of an authorized executor or administrator, or 
successor in interest. 
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the 
judgment is for the recovery of real or personal property or the 
enforcement of a lien thereon. 
(d) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The 
writ of execution shall be issued in the name of the State of 
Utah, and subscribed by the clerk of the court. It shall be 
issued to the sheriff or constable of any eounty in the state 
(and may be issued at the same time to different counties) but 
where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real 
property, it shall be issued to the sheriff of the county where 
the real property or some part thereof is situated. If it requires 
delivery of possession 6f kale of'personal property, it may be 
issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the judg-
ment, stating the court, the docket number, the county where 
the same is entered or docketed, the names of the parties, the 
judgment, and, if it is for the payment of money, the amount 
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. The writ may 
be accompanied by a praecipe executed by the judgment 
creditor or the judgment creditor's counsel generally or spe-
cifically describing the real or personal property to be levied 
upon. It shall be directed to the sheriff of the county in which 
it is to be executed in cases involving real property, and shall 
require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms of 
the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of 
the judgment debtor generally it may direct the sheriff or 
constable to satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the 
non-exempt personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient 
non-exempt personal property cannot be found, then the 
sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with interest, out of the 
judgment debtor's non-exempt real property. 
(e) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be 
served at any time within sixty days after its receipt by the 
officer. It shall then be returned to the court from which it 
issued, and when it is returned the clerk must attach it to the 
record. 
(f) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise 
directs, the offieer must execute the writ against the non-
exempt property of the judgment debtor by levying on a 
sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient property; 
collecting or selling the choses in action and selling the other 
property in the manner set forth herein. Levy includes the 
seizure of the property and holding the property in person or 
through one or more agents, including the judgment debtor, 
appointed by the officer. When there is more property of the 
judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and 
accruing costs within view of the officer, the officer must levy 
only on such part of the property as the judgment debtor may 
indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient to satisfy 
the judgment and costs. 
When an officer has served an execution issued out of any 
court the officer may complete the return thereof after such 
date of service. 
(g) Notice to judgment debtor of sale and of exempt property 
and right to a hearing. At the time the writ of execution is 
issued/ the clerk shall attach to the writ a notice of execution 
and exemptions and right to a hearing and two copies of an 
application by which the judgment debtor may request a 
hearing. 
Upon service of the writ, the sheriff or constable shall serve 
upon the judgment debtor, in the same manner as service of a 
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summons in a civil action, or cause to be transmitted by both 
regular and certified mail, returned receipt requested, to tfre 
judgment debtor's last known address as provided by the 
judgment creditor, (i) the notice of execution and exemptions 
and right to a hearing, and (ii) the application hy which Jhe 
judgment debtor may request a hearing. Upon service of the 
writ, the sheriff or constable may also set the date of sale or 
delivery and serve upon the judgment debtor notice of the date 
and time of sale or delivery in the same manner as service of 
the notice of execution and exemptions and right to a hearing. 
The notice of execution and exemptions that is to be served 
upon the judgment debtor shall indicate in substance that 
certain property is or may be exempt from execution including 
but not limited to a homestead; tpols of the trade; a motor 
vehicle used for the judgment debtor's business or profession; 
social security benefits; supplemental security income ben-
efits; veterans* benefits; unemployment benefits; workers'com-
pensation benefits; public assistance (welfare); alimony; child 
support; certain pensions; part or all of wages or other 
earnings from personal services; certain furnishings an4 ap-
pliances; jnu^jcal instruments; and heirlooms (each not to 
exceed the-amount allowed by Jaw). The nptjce shall also 
indicate tfyat the list is a partial list and otfrer various 
property exemptions may be available under federal law or 
the Utah exemptions statute, and that the judgment debtor 
must request a hearing within ten (10) days from the date of 
service of tl^ e notice upon the judgment debtor. For purposes of 
this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, 
if mailed, or date of delivery, if hand-delivered, and np period 
for mailing under Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the 
time period, 
If the writ, the notice of execution and exemptions and right 
to a hearing cannot be served upon the judgment debtor in the 
same manner* as service of a summons in a civil action, and the 
judgment creditor does no$ have available the judgment 
debtor's last known address, only the following notice' need be 
published under the caption of the case in a newspaper of 
general circulation in each county in which the property levied 
upon, or some part thereof, is situated: 
TO , Judgment Debtor: 
A writ of execution has been issued in the-aboye-
captioned case, directed to the sheriff or constable of 
County, commanding the sheriff or con-
stable as follows: 
"WHEREAS, [Quoting body of writ of 
execution]." 
YOU IVtAY HAVE A RJGHT TO EXEMPT PROPERTY 
from the sale under statutes of the United States or this 
state, including Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 
23, in the manner described in those statutes. 
The date of publication shall be deemed the date of service 
and the date of publication shall be not less than ten (10) days 
prior to the date of sale or delivery, 
This parajgraph (g) shall not be applicable to judicial mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings commenced under Utah Code 
Annotated, Title 78, Chapter a7. 
(h) Request for hearing, 
(11 Time for request The judgment debtor o^r any other 
person who owns or claims an interest in the property subject; 
to execution may request a hearing to claim any exemption to 
the execution, or to challenge the issuance of the writ. Such 
request must be filed or served upon the judgment creditor or 
the attorney for the judgment creditor within ten (10) days of 
the service upon the judgment debtor of the materials re-
quired to be served by paragraph (g) upon the judgment 
debtor. The request for a hearing, which shall be provided to 
the judgment debtor shall be in a form to enable the judgment 
debtor to specify the grounds upon which the judgment debtor 
challenges the issuance of the writ or claims the property 
executed upon to be exempt, in whole or m part. 
(2) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing 
is filed by or on behalf of the judgment debtor, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days from the filing 
of the request and serve notice of that hearing upon all parties 
by first class mail. If the courtdet ermines at the hearing that 
the writ was issued improperly, or that any property seized is 
exempt from or is not subject to execution, the court shall 
immediately issue an order to the officer releasing such 
property or portion thereof from the writ of execution. If the 
court finds that the property or a portion thereof is subject to 
execution and not exempt, it shall issue an order directing the 
officer to proceed with the sale of the non-exempt property 
subject to execution. If the originally scheduled date of sale for 
which notice has been given has passed, notice of the new date 
and time of sale shall be provided as required herein. No sale 
may be held until the Court has decided upon the issues 
presented at the hearing. At the hearing, the court may award 
costs as it deems appropriate. 
(3) If no request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing 
is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the time for doing 
sp has expired, then the officer shall proceed to sell or deliver 
the property subject to execution in accordance with the writ 
and this Rule 69. 
(4) This paragraph (h) shall not be applicable to judicial 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings commenced under Utah 
Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 37. 
(i) Proceedings on sale of property. 
(1) Notice of sale. Before the sale of the property on execu-
tion notice thereof must be given as follows: (A) in case of 
perishable property or animals, by posting written notice of 
the time and place of sale, and generally describing the 
property to be sold, in the district courthouse and in at least 
three other public places of the county or city where the sale is 
to take place, for such a time as may be reasonable, consider-
ing the character and condition of the property; (B) in case of 
other personal property, by posting written notice of the time 
and place of sale, and generally describing the property to be 
sold, in the district courthouse and in at least three public 
places of the county or city where the sale is to take place, for 
not less than seven nor more than 14 days, and by publishing 
a copy thereof at least one time not less than one day 
preceding the sale in some newspaper of general circulation 
published or circulated in the county where the sale is to take 
place, if there is one; (C) in case of real property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale, and particularly 
describing the property, for 21 days, on the property to be sold, 
at the place of sale, at the district courthouse of the oounty 
where the real property to be sold is situated, and in at least 
three public places of the county or city where the sale is to 
take place, and by publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, 
once.a week for 3 successive weeks immediately preceding the 
sale, in some newspaper of general circulation published or 
circulated in the county, if there is one. In addition, except for 
the sale of perishable property or animals, if notice of the date 
land time of sale has not been served upon the judgment debtor 
previously, notice of the date and time of sale shall be served 
upon the judgment debtor personally or by causing the same 
to be transmitted by regular or certified mail to the judgment 
debtor's last known address. 
(2) Postponement If at the time and place appointed for the 
sale of any real or personal property on execution the officer 
shall deem it expedient and for the interest of all persons 
concerned to postpone the sale for want of purchasers, or other 
sufficient cause, the officer may postpone the same from time 
to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every such 
case the officer shall make public declaration thereof at the 
time and place previously appointed for the sale, and if such 
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postponement is for a longer time than 72 hours, notice 
thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original 
notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution 
must be made at auction to the highest bidder, Monday 
through Saturday, legal holidays excluded, between the hours 
of 9 o'clock a.m. and 8 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has 
been sold to satisfy the execution no more shall be sold. 
Neither the officer holding the execution nor such officer's 
deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any 
purchase at such sale. When the sale is of personal property 
capable of manual delivery it must be within view of those who 
attend the sale. The sale must be held in a place reasonably 
accessible to the general public. The property must be sold in 
such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when 
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or 
parcels, they must be sold separately; or when a portion of 
such real property is claimed by a third person, and the third 
person requires it to be sold separately, such portion must be 
thus sold. All sales of real property must b'e made at the 
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part 
thereof, is situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the 
sale, may also direct the order in which the property, real or 
personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of several 
known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be sold to 
advantage separately, and the officer must follow such direc-
tions. The officer shall pay to the judgment creditor or the 
attorney for the judgment creditor so much of the sales 
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the 
proceeds over the judgment and reasonable accrued costs 
must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise 
directed by the judgment or the court. 
(4) Accounting of sale. Upon request of the judgment debtor 
or the judgment debtor's attorney, the plaintiff shall deliver an 
accounting of any execution sale, including the amount due on 
the judgment, accrued costs, and the amount realized at the 
sale. 
(5) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an 
irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the 
amount bid for the property struck off to such purchaser at a 
sale under execution, the officer may again sell the property at 
any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned 
thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable on 
such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished 
accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer i&ay 
also, in such officer's discretion, thereafter reject any other bid 
of such person. 
(6) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal 
property pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale 
shall deliver the property to the purchaser (if such property is 
capable of manual delivery) and shall execute and deliver to 
the purchaser a certificate of sale and payment. Such certifi-
cate stiall state that all right, title and interest which the 
debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or 
attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since 
acquired, is transferred to the purchaser. 
(7) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer 
shall give to the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (A) 
a particular description of the real property sold; (B) the price' 
paid by the purchaser for each lot or parcel if sold separately; 
(C) the whole price paid; (D) a statement to the effect that all 
right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to 
the property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that 
where such sale is subject to redemption that fact shall be 
stated also. A duplicate of such certificate shall be filed for 
record by the officer in the office of the recorder of the county. 
The real property sold shall be subject to redemption, except 
where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' 
unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute. 
(j) Redemption of real property from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Real property sold subject to redemp-
tidn, or any part sold separately,' may be redeemed by the 
following persons or their successors in interest: (A) the 
judgment debtor, (B) a creditor having a lien by judgment, 
mortgage, or other lien on the property sold, or on some share 
or part thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was 
sold. 
(2) Redemption; how made. The person seeking redemption 
may make payment of the amount required to the person from 
whom the property is being redeemed, or for such person to 
the officer who made the sale, or such officer's successor in 
office. At the same time the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom the redemptioner seeks o^ re-
deem, and serve with the notice to the officer; (A) a certified 
copy of the judgment under which the redemptioner claims thQ# 
right to redeem, or, if the redemptioner redeems upon a 
mortgage or other lien, a copy certified by the recorder; (B) an 
assignment, properly acknowledged or proved where the same 
is necessary to establish the claim; (C) an affidavit by the 
redemptioner or an authorized agent showing the amount 
then actually due on the judgment, mortgage or other lien. 
(3)K7lme for redemption; amount to be paid. The property 
may be redeemed within six months after the sale by paying 
the amount of the purchase with a surcharge of 6 percent^, 
thereon in addition, together with the amount of any assess-* 
ment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and 
necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improve-
ments upon the property,which the purchaser may have paid 
thereon after the purchase, with interest at the lawful rate on 
such other amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, 
other than the judgment under which said purchase was 
made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum 
demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person' 
seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for re-
demption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which 
execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the 
same time file with the court and serve upon the purchaser a 
petition setting forth the item or items demanded to which the 
redemptioner objects, together with the grounds of objection; 
and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for 
hearing of such objections. A copy of the order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than five 
days before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the 
petition the court shall enter an order1 determining the 
amount required for redemption. In the event an additional 
amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the 
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such addi-
tional amount within 7 days. The purchaser stiall forthwith 
execute and deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon' 
being paid the amount required by the court for redemption. ' 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by 
a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption 
may, within 60 days after the last redemption anil within six 
months after \he sale, redeem the property from such last 
redemptioner in the same manner as provided in the preced-
ing paragraph, upon paying the sum of such last redemption, 
with a surcharge of three, percent thereon in addition, and the 
amount of any assessment or tax, and any reasonable sum for 
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of' 
any improvements upon the property which the last redemp-
tioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such amount, 
and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last 
redemptioner prior to the redemptioner's own, with interest. 
(5) Notice of redemption. Written notice of any redemption 
shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the 
recorder of the county. Similar notice shall be given of any 
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taxes or assessments or any sums for fire insurance, and 
necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improve-
ments upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or the 
amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the 
redemption was made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve 
any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such 
taxes, assessments, or other liens. » 
(6) Certificate of redemption or conveyance. If no redemp-
tion is made within six months after the sale, the purchaser or 
the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a conveyance, or if so 
redeemed, whenever 60 days have elapsed and no other 
redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has 
been given, the last redemptioner, or assignee, is entitled to a 
sheriff's deed at the expiration of six months after the sale. If 
the judgment debtor redeems, the judgment debtor must 
make the same payments as are required to effect a redemp-
tion by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale 
is terminated and the debtor is restored to the debtor's estate. 
Upon a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom the 
payment is made must execute and, deliver to "the debtor a 
certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate 
must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder 
where the property is situated. 
(7) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from 
the time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from 
the time of redemption until another redemption, is entitled to 
receive from any tenant in possession the rents of the property 
sold or the value of the use and occupation thereof. But when 
any rents or profits have been received by the judgment 
creditor or purchaser, or their assigns, from the property thus 
sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents 
and profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be 
paid1; and if the redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the 
expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands 
in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or their assigns, a 
written and verified statement of the amounts of such rents 
and profits thus received, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five days after such sworn statement is given by such 
purchaser or such purchaser's assigns to such redemptioner or 
debtor. If such purchaser or such purchaser's assigns shall for 
a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor 
may, within 60 days after such demand, bring an aiction to 
compel an accounting and disclosure of such rents and profits, 
and until 15 days from and after the final determination of 
such action the right of redemption is extended to such 
redemptioner or debtor. 
(k) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for' 
redemption, the court may restrain the commission of waste 
on the property, upon motion, with or without notice, of the 
purchaser, or such purchaser's successor in interest. But it is 
not waste for the person in possession of the property at the 
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the 
period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the 
same manner' in which it was previously used, or to use it in 
the ordinary course of husbandry, or to make the necessary 
repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber on the 
property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for a 
family while such person occupies the property. After the 
estate has become absolute, the purchaser or a successor in 
interest may maintain an action to recover damages for injury 
to the property by the tenant or other person in possession 
after sale and before possession is delivered under the convey-
ance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or 
is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of 
irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or be-
cause the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, 
or because of the reversal or discharge of the judgment, a 
purchaser of property sold on execution, or a successor in 
interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed thereof 
or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof 
shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to the 
judgment creditor as the court may prescribe, enter judgment 
against such judgment creditor for the price paid by the 
purchaser, together with interest In the alternative, if such 
purchaser or a successor in interest, fails to recover possession 
of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom 
in consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning 
the sale, or because the properly sold was not subject to 
execution and sale, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall, 
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment 
debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the original judg-
ment' in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by such 
purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of 
payment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and 
the judgment so revived shall have the same force and effect 
as would an original judgment of the date of the revival. 
(1) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When 
upon an execution against several persons more than a pro 
rata part of the judgment is satisfied out of the proceeds of the 
sale of the property of one, or one cf them pays, without a sale, 
more than such person's proportion, and the right of contribu-
tion exists, such person may compel such contribution from 
the others; and where a judgment against several is upon an 
obligation of one or more as security for the others, and the 
surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of 
property or otherwise, the surety may require reimbursement 
from the principal. The person entitled to contribution or 
reimbursement shall, within one month after payment, or sale 
of the property in the event there is a sale, file in the court 
where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment 
and the claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the 
filing of such notice the clerk must make an entry thereof in 
the margin of the docket which shall have the effect of a 
judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent of 
their liability for contribution or reimbursement. 
(m) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment 
debtor. After the issuance of an execution and before its 
return, any person indebted to the judgment debtor may pay 
to the officer the amount of the debt, or so much thereof as may 
be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt 
is a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(n) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer 
shall proceed to levy any execution on any goods or chattels 
claimed by any person other than the defendant, or should the 
officer be requested by the judgment creditor so to do, such 
officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertak-
ing, with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and 
damages that thev officer may sustain by reason of the deten-
tion or sale of such property; and until such undertaking is 
given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property 
(o) Order for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest. At any 
time when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from 
which an execution might issue shall, upon written motion of 
the judgment creditor, with or without notice as the court may 
determine, issue an order requiring the judgment debtor, or if 
a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court, a 
master, or other person appointed by the court, at a specified 
time and place to answer concerning the judgment debtor's 
property. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer 
thereof, may be required to attend outside the county in which 
such person resides, but the court may make such order as to 
mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also restrain 
the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt prop-
erty pending the hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings 
may be had for the application of the property of the judgment 
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[T toward the satisfaction of the judgment as on execution 
ist such property. 
Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time 
execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by 
tvit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the court that any 
n or corporation has property of such judgment debtor or 
lebted to the judgment debtor in an amount exceeding 
lundred fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, the 
may order such person or corporation or any officer or 
thereof, to appear before tjie court ort a master at a 
led time and place to answer concerning' the same. 
JSS fees and mileage, if any, may be awarded by the court. 
Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that 
son or corporation, alleged to have property of the 
lent debtor or to be indebted to the judgment debtor in 
lount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, 
s an interest in the property adverse to such judgment 
r or denies such indebtedness, the court may order such^ 
a or corporation to refrain from transferring or otherwise 
;ing of such interest or debt until such time as may 
iably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring an 
to determine such interest or claim anfl prosecute the 
to judgment. Such order may be modified or vacated by 
urt at any time upon such terms as may be just. 
Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and 
r
 in any proceedings brought under this rule in the same 
3r as upon the trial of an issue. 
Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court 
ster may order any property of the judgment debtor, not 
it from execution, in the possession of the judgment 
or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, to 
>lied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
\ppointment of receiver. The court may appoint a re-
of the property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from 
ion, and may forbid any transfer or other disposition 
f or interference therewith until its further order 
1; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with 
d property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of the 
itment shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of 
unty in which any real estate sought to be affected 
y is situated. 
TO. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
udgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land 
sliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other 
; act and the party fails to comply within the time 
?d, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of 
obedient party by some other person appointed by the 
nd the act when so done has like effect as if done by the 
)n application of the party entitled to performance and 
>rder of the court, the clerk shall issue a writ of 
nent or sequestration against the property of the dis-
lt party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court 
50 in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real 
onal property is within the state, the court in lieu of 
ig a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment divest-
title of any party and vesting it in others and such 
nt has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form 
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of 
ion, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to 
f execution or assistance upon application to the clerk. 
LA. Process in behalf of and against persons not 
es. 
L an order is made in favor of a person who is not a 
> the action, he may enforce obedience to the order by 
e process as if he were a party; and, when obedience to 
an order may be lawfully enforped against a. person who is not 
a party, he is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience, 
to the order as if he were a party. 
Rule 71B. Proceedings wh^re parties not summoned. 
(a) Effect of failure to serve all defendants. Where the action 
is against two or more $efendanta and the summons is served 
on one or more, but not all of them, the plaintiff may proceed 
against the defendants served in the same manner as if they 
were the only defendants.1 
(b) Proceedings after judgment against parties not origi-
nally served. When a judgment has been recovered against one 
or more, but not all, of several persons jointly indebted upon 
an obligation, the plaintiff may require any person not origi-
nally served with the summons to appear and show cause why 
he should not'be bound by the judgment in the same manner 
as though he had been originally served with process. 
(c) Summbns and affidavit; contents and service. The plain-
tiff shall issue a summons, describing' the judgment, and* 
requiring the defendant "to appear within the time required for 
appearance in response to an original summons, and show' 
cause why he should not* be bound by such judgment. The 
summons, together witn a copy of an affidavit on behalf of the 
plaintiff to the effect that the judgment, qr some part thereof 
remains unsatisfied,-and specifying the amount actually due' 
thereon, shall lie served upon the defendant and returned in 
the same manner as the original summons. 
(d) What constitutes the pleadings. The pleadings shall 
consist of plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the answer of 
the defendant, if any; provided that if defendant denies his 
liability on the obligation upon which -the judgment was 
originally recovered, a copy of the original complaint and 
judgment shall be included. 
(e) Hearing; judgment. The matter may be tried as other 
cases; but if the issues are found against the defendant, the 
judgment shall not exceed the amount of the original judg-
ment remaining unsatisfied, with interest and costs. 
PART IX. APPEALS 
Rules 72 to 76. Repealed. 
PART X. DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS 
Rule 77. District courts and clerks. 
(a) District courts always open. The district courts shall be 
deemed always open for the purpose of filing any pleading or 
other proper paper, of issuing and returning mesne and final 
process, and of making and directing all interlocutory motions, 
orders, and rules. 
(b) Trials and hearings; orders in chambers. All trials upon 
the merits shall be conducted in open court and so far as 
convenient in a regular courtroom. All other acts or proceed-
ings may be done or conducted by a judge in chambers without 
the attendance of the clerk or other court officials and at any 
place within the state, either within or without the district; 
but no hearing, other than one ex parte, shall be conducted 
outside the county wherein the matter is pending without the 
consent of all the parties to the action affected thereby. 
(c) Clerk's office and orders by clerk. The clerk's office with 
the clerk or a deputy in attendance shall be open during 
business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and 
legal holidays. All motions and applications in the clerk's office 
for issuing mesne process, for issuing final process to enforce 
and execute judgments, for entering defaults or judgments by 
default, and for other proceedings which do not require^ 
allowance or order of the court are grantable of course by the 
